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IN THE SUPREM'E COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~() l Hf1ll1£RK P,:\ CTFIC ( 1 ( ):JI P.t\X)r, 
a corporation, Pl . t .11 d A 11 t .a~n ~ an ]Jpr aJl ., 
-vs.-
~~B~. Hl~LJ~X ~HE1~lf_._:\X _AH1~ll1'"R, 
and ~r R S . GLENERA SHEEHAN 
I Ir .. XTEl~~ 
DefeJtdaHfs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
XICT( Cl-fOl'"l~.XOS and \VIFE, 
Defendants and RespondeHfs,. 
-vs.-
~fiLTON -4\. OniAN et al, 
Defe nda Jlf."·, Respondents, and 
Cross- .._4JJ }Jell (t Jl fs. 
Ca~e Xo. 
9123 
BRIJ~F (fB., J)}~1~1 11~XD:\ xrr~. l~E~J>( )XD}~Xrrs. 
~\XD c~ROSN-_[\ P PELL_._L\NTS 
rJlhe H})pellant i~ a private intere~tatt> railroad COr-
poration~ operating a rail line 'Yest,Yard fro1u Ogden. 
l ... tah, across or throgh a portion of the "Taters of Great 
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Salt Lake in Box Elder Conty, Utah (Tr. 328, Ex. 1). 
In the exercise of its statutory power of eminent domain 
(Utah Code Annotated for 1953, Sees. ·78-34-1 to 17) 
appellant condemned and took several n1illion cubic 
yards (Tr. 239, 243, 344, 361-3) of sand and gravel 
from the lands of respondents (Ex. 1, Tr. 1-1). It is 
in1portant to note that this eminent don1ain proceeding 
did not involve the usual taking by the conden1nor of 
the title to the land. This \Vas a proceeding by the con-
demnor to enter upon the lands of the respondents for 
the sole purpose of removing therefron1 the sand and 
gravel and other 1naterial ·w·hich \vere contained \vithin 
these lands, and to use these 1ninerals in building a ne\v 
railroad bed by the appellant railroad co1npany. 
The three separate cases \vhich appellant had ini-
ated in the lower court to take the sand and gravel fro1n 
the three separate O\Ynerships of land involved (Tr. 17-
18) were, with the consent of the parties, tried together 
before a jury to deter1nine the dan1ages to be a\Yarded 
each of the defendants (Tr. 7-8). Fron1 the a,,,.ards n1ade 
and the judg1nent entered in the t\YO cases X os. S071 
and 8191 and fron1 the denial by the lo\ver court of 
appellant's 1notion for a ne\Y trial as to each of the three 
cases, including Case No. 8192, appellant prosecutes this 
appeal. The case involving the Sheehan sisters, Jlrs. 
llunter and l\1rs. Arthur, ",.as designated in the lo\ver 
court as No. 8071. The case in \Yhich Nick Chournos and 
his \Yife \Yere na1ned as defendants \Yas there desi()'nated ~ 
as No. 8191. And the third case designated in the lo\ver 
court as No. 8192 \Yas against niilton A. On1an, Xick 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( •hournos, Nant ( 1hourno:-; and each of their 'YiYe~. Thi~ 
third ra~P involved placer 111ining property o\\·npd by 
the ~aid ~ix defendant~. The lands in eaeh of the tsvo 
fir~t ahove-1nentioned ease~ \\rere patented land~ o\\·necl 
h~# the respect i y·e parties. 
-'"-\~ to the patented lands, l 1ase Nos. 8071 and 8191. 
the lo\\·er court ~nburitted to the jury a speeial foru1 of 
vPnliet requiring that it separately deter1nine the value 
per eubie ~·ard, and the total value of all sand and gravel 
taken hy appellant frou1 the respective land:s, and in 
Pneh of those t'vo ease~ the eourt also requested th12 
jury to fix the damages, if any, caused by the ~evPranee 
of the use of the lands fron1 "·hich the gravel and sand 
'vas re1noved, to their re1naining lands. In each of those 
t\\·o ease~, the jury found a dan1age to the respective 
defendants (respondents) for the quantity of sand and 
gravel taken fron1 their lands, and also found that ~ 
~PYerance da1nage \\·as caused in each of those case~ 
and fixed the an1ount thereof. In each of the~e cases. 
the court entered judg1nent to eonfor1n to the verdict 
as soon as the verdict 'vas returned in June, 1959 as 
to the value of the sand and gravel onl)·, but reserved 
for so1ne tiu1e, until July 21, 1959, the entry of judgn1ent 
as to the severance R\Yard. 
_._:_\_s to the third case, the case involving the sand 
and gravel plaeer 1nining clain1, designated in the lo\Yer 
court as X o. 819:2, the court subn1itted a special forn1 
of verdict to the jury requiring them to detern1ine the 
Yalue per cubic yard and the total value of the sann 
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and gravel re1noved therefrom as was done 1n each 
of the other two cases. But no severance damage was 
involved in that case and no request was 1nade by the 
court that the jury make any finding relative thereto. 
The jury found and determined the same value per 
cubic yard of the sand and gravel taken by appellant 
in this case as in each of the other two cases. Of course, 
no severance damage was found by the jury in connection 
with the placer mining claim case. Upon the urging of 
appellant's counsel, the court withheld entry of any 
judgment in this mining claim case until N" ovember 2, 
1959. From the judgn1ent which the court finally entered 
in this one case on November 2, 1959, the defendants 
in the lo\ver court bring a cross appeal, herein contained. 
But this same case is also here on appeal by Southern 
Pacific Company fro1n denial by the lo\\Ter court of its 
motion for a new trial. 
The respondents in the lo\ver court cases X os. 8071 
and 8191 agreed to a conditional order of the court that 
they file notice of willingness to accept one half the 
severance da1nage a\varded by the jury in each case, 
plus the full a\Yard Inade on the Yalue of the gravel 
and sand. The respondents filed their acceptance of this 
condition, but the appellant refused to pay the judgn1ents 
even on that reduced basis. The court then entered 
judg1nent in each of those cases for the full jury a\vard, 
both as to the value of the sand and gravel and also 
as to the severance da1nage a\vard. The lo"~er court 
then denied the 1notion for a ne\Y trial \Yhich the appel-
lant filed as to each of the three cases. Fron1 that 
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particular denial appellant prosecutes this appeal on 
all three cases. 
But as to the placer nun1ng case, lo\\"er court No. 
81 ~):Z, it is here also by ,,,.ay of a cross-appeal from the 
judgrnent \Yhich the court finally entered, in that case. 
The brief of the appellants (defendants) in that case 
is included under this same cover at the conclusion of 
the brief for respondnets ansvvering the brief of Southern 
Pacific ·Cornpany, appellant. This appeal on behalf of 
the defendants belovv in the placer mining case is in-
cluded here by agreement of the parties and \vith the 
verbal per1nission granted by this court, to save tin1e 
and expense of printing separate briefs in and pursuing 
that case in a separate appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant detern1ined upon a project to replace the 
trestle or bridge vvhich it had previously used in sup-
porting its railroad trackage across Great Salt Lake 
( Tr. 328). A 13-mile earth fill 'vas to be constructed 
through the lake ( Tr. 286) to replace this trestle, and 
it involved a great earth moving project requiring -±-+ 
ruillion cubic yards of sand and gravel ( Tr. 303), the 
project costing $50 million (Tr. 304, 328). Only certain 
types of sand and gravel could be used to properly 
construct this road bed and tests vvere made and test 
holes drilled in different areas b:,. appellant to locate) 
and detern1ine ideally suited materials ( Tr. 290, 302, 
305, 316). Location of these 1naterials \\"as also important 
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to appellant from the standpoint of their distance fron1 
place at which the great fill was to be built (Tr. 305). 
Appellant looked at and tested materials at other sites 
and locations, but finally determined that the area in 
w11ich respondents' lands were located along the west 
side of Pro1nontory ~fountain near the east end of the 
proposed fill was 1nost suitable (Ex. 1, Tr. 286, 302, 
303, 304, 305). The sand and gravel of respondents \vas 
so ideally located with relation to the proposed project 
that the loaded conveyor belts and trucks used in hauling 
this material from the beds of deposit to the fill n1oved 
dovvn grade with the loads (Tr. 303). Appellant actually 
owned a gravel pit of its O\Yn in this area but use of 
that material \vould have involved an expensive, ap-
proximately 5-mile additional truck haul of the sand 
and gravel (Tr. 305, 306, Ex. 1). 
It is important to note that the sand and gravel 
involved in the cases herein 'vas not conde1nned until 
t\vo or three years after the project concerned had 
begun. It \:vas as early as 1955 that appellant \Yas ne-
gotiating for the purchase of sand and gravel for use 
in this project, and it signed a contract on ..._\.ugust 15 
of that year with one Del H . ..._\.danls to pay to hin1 
$100,000 for up to 56 1nillion cubic yards of 1naterials 
to be taken fro1n lands he O\vns "~hich are adjacent 
to the lands of respondents herein (Ex. 1, Ex. 8~ Tr. 
308, 314, 326, 331). Also, the respondents herein \Yere 
\Vell a,,~are of this projeet by reason of an e1ninent 
do1nain proceeding not involved herein \Vhieh appellant 
had filed against the sa1ne Mrs. Glenera Sheehan Hun-
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ter, \\·ho i~ involved here as respondent in the lo,Yer 
eourt rasp X o. 8071. That ea~P 'vas proseeuted h)· the 
appellant herein for the purpose of taking by condern-
nation the right to construct the large conYe)·or belt 
used in transporting the sand and gravel aeross the 
lands of :\Irs. Hunter located in the southea8t corner 
of the ~au1e St>etion :2, T. G N., R. G \Y., as is involved 
in this appeal (Ex. 1, Tr. 211). >K• Appellant also had 
prPviously seeured the use of an SO-acre tract in Section 
11 of this to\\·nship o\\·ned b)· the respondent herein, :\I r. 
Chournos, upon \\·hich to build its construction to,,·nsite 
( Tr. :)20-1). 
It \\·as rnore than t\vo yean-; after the date of the 
said contraet \Yith ~lr. Adarns for purchase frorn hi1n 
of sand and gravel ( Tr. 290, 292, 309) and after the 
project had been under \vay for approxirnatel)· the sarne 
period of tirnP ( Tr. 23) that eminent dornain proceedings 
\\·ere begun to secure the right to take the rnaterials 
fron1 the adjacent lands of respondents herein. The 
Suunnons in the proceeding herein against the Sheehan 
sisters, 1\irs. Hunter and 1\irs. Arthur, to take sand and 
gravel frorn their lands in Section 1 and 2 of the above 
to,vnship \\·as served on October 11, 1957 ( Tr. :296). 
It \\·as about seven rnon.ths after that date, or on J nne 
11. 195S, that the proceedings·. (designated in the lo\Yer 
court as l\ os. H191 and 8192) "~ere initiated in the other 
t\\TO cases involved here to take similar rnaterials fron1 
the ( 1hournos fee lands and frorn the placer clairu ('Tr. 
*The sumons in that case was served on June 20, 1956 and that case 
is designated in the same lower court as No. 7857. 
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296, 300). Test holes had been drilled upon respondents' 
lands by appellant to determine the quality and amount 
of suitable sand and gravel located therein ( Tr. 291) · 
The quantity of sand and gravel taken by the ap-
pellant from the parcels of lands involved herein owned 
by the different respondents was stipulated by the par-
ties at the consolidated trial of the -three cases and the 
yardage involved in each of the cases \vas: 
Froin the lands in Case No. 8071 ____ 1,909,449 cu. yards 
From the lands in Case N' Oo 8191 ____ 2,052,698 cu. yards 
From the lands in Case No. 8192 ____ 1,222,899 cu. yards 
( Tr. 239-243, 344, 361-3). 
There was no sho\ving that there \Yas any difference 
1n the n1arket value in place of the sand and gravel 
taken from respondents' lands as of the t\YO different 
dates involved, October 11, 1957 and June 11, 1958. It 
was stipulated that the value in each \\-as to be as of 
October 22, 1957. The jury found that Yalue to be 3c 
per cubic yard in each case, and the court entered judg-
ment accordingly· in the case K os. 8071 and S191, but 
reserved entry of judgn1ent in the ren1aining case (Tr. 
361-3). j 
At the tri~ne::"p~ced eight well qualified 
witnesses as to the value of the sand and gravel in 
place at the ti1ne of tJ1e service of sun1n1ons in these 
cases. Six of these testified (Tr. 21-l-!1)and the parties 
stipulated that if the remaining t\YO \Yitnesses \\'"ere called 
to testify for respondents that their testin1ony \Yould 
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be <'tunulative and substantially as had been previously 
tPstified ( Tr. l-t-~-3). 
A qualified professional appraiser, Charles E. 
Htory, called h),. respondents testified the value per cubic 
~·ard to be 3e as of October 1957, ( Tr. 30) and the sa1ne 
value a~ of June 1958 (Tr. 31). 
J. P. Gibbons, president of the well-kno,vn \vestern 
construction firn1 of Gibbons and Reed of Salt Lake City, 
a person \Vith many years experience in the use, purchase 
and sale of materials of the type "'"ith \vhich ,,,.e are 
involved here used in construction projects of different 
types { Tr. 40-45), also fixed the damage to respondents 
for the taking of their sand and .gravel herein at 5c 
per cubic yard (Tr. 46). He would have paid 5c per 
yard for this material had he been building this project 
(Tr. 47). 11r. Douglas J. Fife, also a person engaged 
for n1any years in the construction business (Tr. 64) 
and the O\\'"ner of a gravel pit near Brigham City, Utah 
( Tr. G-+) also testified that the average value of respond-
ents' sand and gravel for the time involved was 5c per 
cubic yard ( Tr. 68). He sells sand and gravel at his own 
pit near Brighan1 Cit~,., utah, at $1.15 per cubic yard. 
(Tr. 78). 
The above testin1ony as to the value in place of the 
sand and gravel involved \\'"as supported b~,. the testimon~,. 
of t\vo additional construction co1npany OV{ners, 1Iel-
bourne Ford of Provo, T;tah, ( Tr. 89-115) and ~Jac-k 
Parsons (Tr. 131-142). 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Douglas H. Bram1ner was called as a ·w·itness for 
respondents in connection with the quality of the sand 
and gravel which appeallant had re1noved froin respond-
ents' pits. He is a graduate civil engineer employed 
with the firm of Sumner-Margetts Company of Salt Lake 
City \vhich perforn1s soil analyses work (Tr. 8:2). IIis 
testi1nony \vas that sou1e of these sands and gravel were 
of such high quality that they were suitable for concrete 
aggregate use \vithout washing or treat1nent ( Tr. 83-
84), and that this sand and gravel co1npares favorably 
with like n1aterial fro1n other pits (Tr. 84:). 
Ti1e State of l-:-tah O\vns the Section 36 on the north 
\\Tall of the canyon kno,vn as Little ,~alley adjacent on 
the north to the Section 1 fro1n \vhich n1ost of the sand 
and gravel herein \vas taken by appellant from respond-
ents' lands (Ex. 1). Lee E. Young, ~Ianager and ap-
praiser for the l~tah State Land Board in charge of 
the 1nanage1nent of the lands of the State, testified that 
this section \vas rocky, (Tr. 1:20) "Tith n1uch 'vaste and 
that it \\'"as inaccessible ( Tr. 1:23). Yet interest in a rock 
and gravel lease of this entire section "'"aS developed 
in 1955 and \vas entered into \\'"ith a private party~ J. 
T. [Tnder\vood of Ogden, at 1 ~~~c per cubic yard, \vith 
the State charging $3:20 per 8ecti on a~ the lease fee. 
or 50c per acre, in addition to the price per cubic yard 
for an~,. 1naterial dug out of thi~ section, pln~ a royalt~T 
to be paid back to the State ( Tr. 1:2:1). Thi~ \va~ before 
appellant had built ih;; conve~,.or belt into Little \:alleY 
but it \\'"HS doing the exploration \Vork at that tin1~ 
(Tr. 123). 
10 
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... \ eon~idPrnble part of the 1naterial pnrcha8ed by 
appPllant front the D~l ll. ... \da1ns lan<l~ c-ould only be 
~P('Ul'Pd hy hreaking up rocky ledges ,,·ith \vorld record--
size explosive eharges \vhich involved ronsiderable ex-
pen~e for appellant in the building of tunnels under the 
roek and in the use of explosives ( ~rr. 3:3;)-36). X o such 
expen~P \Ya~ nece~sar)'" in securing and ntoving the sand 
and gravel of any of these respondents. It \vas scooped 
up fro111 its natural location and loaded direetly onto 
the conveyor belt (Tr. 336). It was a do,vn grade haul 
fro1u the place \Yhere these 1naterials "'"ere located to the 
~iteofuse (Tr.303). 
It eosts eonsiderable to haul this 1nateriaL ahout ;)<· 
per ton per 1nile on the higlr\;vays ( Tr. 51, 71, 110) anrl 
that ele1nent 'veighed favorably in connection \vith the 
taking h)'" appellant of respondents' near-by, quality 
n1aterial ( Tr. 305). Appellant's own gravel pit located 
on thi~ sa1ne 1nountain 'vas too far a"'"ay fro1n the plaee 
of use to he acceptable to the1n ( Tr. 306). 
Respondents' sand and gravel \vas available and 
accessible along an old road \vhich extended through 
this Little \Talley (Tr. 161). It \Vas a s1nooth, \vide can-
yon, not steep (Ex. 5, 6, 7, Tr. 154), the heart or center 
of \vhich 'vas re1noved by the hauling out of this sand 
and ·gravel ( Tr. 162), located on the san1e side of the 
Pron1ontory :Jlountain as the fill ",.hich appellant \Va~ 
to construct ( Exs. 1, 5, 6, 7) . 
.... :\hove is set forth the factual state1nent relating to 
the 1narket value, in place, of the sand and gravel \vhich 
] 1 
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appellant removed fro1n the lands of respondents in-
volved in each of the three cases which were tried 
together. There is present here an additional element 
of damage in t\vo of the cases only; that is, in the lower 
court Cases, No. 8071 in which the Sheehan sisters, ~Irs. 
IIunter and ~Irs. Arthur, are respondents, and in No. 
8191 in which Nick Chournos et ux are the only re-
spondents. The sand and gravel placer mining clain1 is 
not involved in this additional element of damage. Belo\v 
is set forth the factual statement relating to the damage 
done the remaining lands of the respondents involved 
in the t\\TO above-named cases, through the excaYation 
by the appellant of the sand and gravel from their Little 
Valley lands. 
The respondents, in each of the t\YO said cases, O\Vn 
thousands of acres of grazing lands of \vhich the area 
from \vhich the sand and gravel "~as taken by appellant 
\vas a very in1portant part (Tr. 1±5-7, 1-±S~ 15±, 17±~ 186). 
Chournos has O\vned and used in his life-tn11e grazing 
operation (Tr. 144) about 110,000 acres of range lands 
(Tr. 145-7) a very i1nportant part of \Yhich is \vithin 
and surrounding the lands upon \Yhieh appellant dug 
out its vast pits. (Ex. 1. 5, 6, 7). The 1:2,000 acres O\vned 
by the respondents, ~Irs. Hunter and :\Irs. Arthur. are 
si1nilarly located \vith regard to these excayations (Tr. 
186, Ex. 1, 5, 6, 7). The lands of these sisters haYe also 
been continuously used in livestock operations for 1nany 
y·ears - since 1931 to the kno\\Tledge of :Jir. Chournos 
and the \\Titness 1\lr. J(eller (Tr. 169, ~~1). Prior to that 
tinlP and before the death of their father, their parents 
12 
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had lived upon this ranch novl o'vned by the daughters 
( ~rr. 169). These lands were valuable in the grazing and 
proteeting of sheep during the winter months (Tr. 146, 
1-l-H, 15-t, 170, 191). Appellant's excavations destroyed 
for all ti1ne a vital and key part of these lands (Tr. 
1f)-t, 170-71, 324, 333). 
Regarding this severance or consequential damage 
proble1n, it is to. be noted that the lands of the respectiv'2 
respondents, frou1 which appellant dug up and re1noved 
the sand and gravel, constituted a part, not only of a 
larger tract from which these materials were re1noved 
(Ex. 1), but they were a part of a very much larger 
acreage of disconnected lands owned in each instance 
by the respective respondents within this same Promon-
tor~'" ~.fountain area (Ex. 1) and were being used in 
connection "Tith the unified use by the parties of all 
of their said lands at the time appellant took p·ossession 
under its eminent do1nain proceedings (Tr. 147, 17 4, 186, 
191). As to the respondent ·Chournos, he owns consider-
able other acreage, in addition to his Promontory 1\Ioun-
tain lands, (Tr. 144-5) and the value of all of which 
lands and the use thereof in his one unified business 
"~as adversely affected (Tr. 184). 
The respondent Nick Chournos has o\vned and op-
erated his o,,~n sheep outfit in Box Elder, Cache and 
Rich Counties in the northern end of Utah for the last 
3G ~'"ears. In these three counties he owns \Videly separ-
ated acreages of range lands used in his single~ unified 
sheep operation. He O\vns and grazes a total of 110,000 
13 
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acres of lands in these three counties, and leases approxi-
mately 23,00.0 acres from the State of Utah adjoining 
his owned lands. He also grazes some public d~main 
lands ( Tr. 144-5). To round out his year-long grazing 
operation, his sheep are moved from one of his land 
areas to another as the seasons change. He grazes during 
the summer season upon hisl approximately 20,000 acres 
of high elevation ranges in the Monte Cristo area of 
Rich and Cache Counties (Tr. 146-7, 219). In the \Yinter 
months, he 1noves his sheep to his approxi1nately 70,000 
acres of ovvned range and the intermingled State lease 
and public do1nain lands in \\~estern Box Elder County 
near the K evada State Line ( Tr. 145-6, 219). The 20,000 
acres \vhich he o\vns upon the Promontory .:Jiountain 
are grazed during a part of the "'inter and for the spring 
la1nbing season (Tr. 146, 185, Ex. 1). 
The respondent (~hournos operates approxi1nately 
6,000 e\ves, \Vhieh annually produce approxin1ately· the 
san1e number of la1nbs, and all of \vhieh 12,000 head of 
sheep are taken back to the said high sunnner ranges 
in ~lay or June after the lan1bs are born and docked out. 
Here they are all grazed until the la1nbs are sold as 
111eat ani1nals about Septe1nber of each year (Tr. 1-!5-
6-7 -8). All of the ~aid l;hournos lands are used and re-
quired to round out a year-long operation during the 
different ~easons (Tr. 147-S, 176) ..... \.bout :2500 of these 
e\\~es are la1nbed out upon these Pron1ontory ~fountain 
ranges ( Tr. 148). These lands and their use in this sheep 
grazing operation eonsti tute one unified business opera-
tion (Tr. 147). Each of these different range areas sup-
14 
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ple1nent~ the other to round out thi~ ~Tear-long gra~1ng 
hu~inP~~ ('J1r. 1-+7). 
l ... pon thi~ sanH· I>ro1uontory .JI ountain and adjacent 
to and inter1ningled 'Yith the ·Chournos land~ in thi~ 
arPa, in ~ueh a 'vay that a grazing usP of the area 
1nean~ a use of the lands of all, the respondent si~ter~. 
~Lrs. _..:\rthur and l\l rs. Hunter, o'Yn 1:Z,OOO a ere~ of 
grazing lands (Ex. 1, ~r r. 17 -+, 177, 186, 200, :Z 13, ~(i5). 
~rhe Del Ji. Adan1s, heretofore referred to herein, al~o 
o\\·ns about 8,000 acres of grazing land:-~ on this :-;a1ne 
l)rou1ontory· ~I ot1ntain, and, though hi~ land~ are :-;uh-
~tantiall~T in the south end of this peninsula, the~r are 
also inter1ningled soule\vhat \Yith the ll unter-.Axthur 
and Chournos o'Ynership and, particularly \Yith that of 
Chournos (Ex. 1, Tr. 213, :Z51, :Z65, :2()7 -:Z(i8). \Y.ith the 
exception of about a thousand aeres of public do1uain 
\vhich the Governinent has reserved in this area, and a 
fe"T placer 1nining elain1s O\Yned by l\lr. Chournos and 
other~, and one of 'vhich clai1ns is alone involved in thi~ 
sa1ne appeal, as heretofore explained, and except for a 
gravel pit O\vned by appellant itself, (Tr. 306), the above 
said 40,000 acres of land constitute the total O\Ynership 
for several 1niles in all directions fro1n the gravel pit~ 
inYolved here (Ex. 1, 216). l\fr. Chournos alone hold:-; 
the right to graze the said s1nall acreage of public do1nain 
(Tr. 176-7. 186). 
\\~hile neither l\Irs. Hunter nor ~Irs. Arthur ar~ 
actively engaged in the livestock business, their lands 
are valuable for this use and \vere leased for 1uany 
YPar~ (a~ early as 1931) by the respondent ( 1 hourno~ 
15 
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(Tr. 169) and later by Boyd Keller (Tr. 221). For about 
the last five years, they have been leased by the said 
Del I--I ..... ~dams at an annual rental of $7,000, or ap-
proximately 50c per acre (Tr. 170, 191). 
rrhe Promontory Mountain lands of Chournos and 
of the Sheehan sisters, Mrs. Hunter and l\1rs. Arthur, 
lie in substantial acreages on both sides of this high, 
steep 1nountainous ridge or range, which projects due 
southward into the north end of Great Salt Lake, in 
a strip of land from about 4Y2 to 6Y2 n1iles in width, 
for some 25 miles, and the south 13 mlies of ''Thich is 
O\vned, \Vi th the exceptions hereto£ ore noted, by these 
respondents (Ex. 1, Tr. 260, 273-4, 284) extending fro111 
the lake shore on the east to the lake shore on the 
west (Ex. 1). 
In grazing this entire Pron1ontory )fountain land 
area of respondents during the \Vinter and lambing sea-
son, it is necessary fron1 the standpoint of the need for 
continuously changing feed and in the use of sno\v~ 
water and to 1neet the challenge of \\inter \vea ther con-
ditions, that the sheep n1ove back and forth fron1 the 
lands on one side of this n1ountain to the lands on the 
other side ( Tr. 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 1G:2, 19S~ 215, ~~5, 
227). This Little \,..alley or canyon fron1 "·hich appellant 
took the sand and gravel fron1 respondents and fro1n 
the adjacent land of others provided the only road across 
this Inountain, through l\Iaple Canyon on the east side 
of the ridge and down Little \Talley on its "·est side (Tr. 
161, 227). 
16 
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Little \!" allt)y extends from the west lake shore due 
east to the head of 11aple Canyon ( Tr. 158, 1G1, Exs. 5, 
G, 7) through vvhich this only road extended ( Tr. 161, 
'J'J7) and a low pass lay due east through Little \r alley 
across the top of the Inountain which livestock did and 
could use in passing back and forth from one side of the 
rnountain to the other (Tr. 155, 161., 235). This Little 
\Talley canyon was the biggest one on the mountain, the 
finest piece of range in that area, not too steep, the 
key canyon to the rest of the range (Tr. 154). It would, 
alone, take care of 1200 of the 2500 ewes which Chournos 
larubed in this area with their lambs. It \vould care for 
these evves and lambs for 45 days in the spring (Tr. 
148, 159, 160). Appellant destroyed the folage producing 
capacity upon the lands within the pit for all time 
(Tr. 171). 
Before this pit was constructed, the sheep could feed 
and graze in a natural way, not being driven, through 
Little , ... alley (Tr. 161, 162, 198, 225) and either down 
l\Iaple Canyon on the east side (Ex. 1, Tr. 161, 227) 
or over a pass immediately south of the head of Maple 
Canyon to the east shore lands (Tr. 161, 225, Ex. 1). 
This passage\vay -vvas very important in making a natural 
utilization of the forage types on each side of the 
rnountain (Tr. 160, 162) and the only water available 
for these sheep is at the mouth of Little \ 1 alley on the 
\vest lake shore ( Tr. 157, 158, 162, 215). While sheep 
can secure their \Yater requirements from sno,v, when 
that is available to them, and Little Valley provided a 
natural place at its head for this ( 158, 225), the~~ 1nust 
17 
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have strean1 or spring water when the snow is gone. 
This dry condition is found in this area both in the fall 
before snow has arrived and in the spring after it has 
rnelted a\\Tay, and the mouth of Little Valley provided 
this water (Tr. 157, 158, Ex. 1). Occasionally, sno\vs, 
too deep for sheep to survive will fall, and in this con-
dition, Little Valley offered a safe and gradual retreat 
to lo\\Ter elevation ranges ( Tr. 156, 157, 226, 227, :2:28, 
Ex. 1, 5, 6, 7). 
In conditions \vhen the sno\V is too deep, it \Yill 
al\\Tays be and ren1ain deeper on the east side of the 
Inountain ~Tr. 231), and the \Yest side in and near Little 
\~alley offers the only safe \Yinter range in these extreme 
conditions ( Tr. 229). There are only 2¥2 to 3 sections 
of range \\"'hich is safe for livestock in these extre1ne 
\\rinter conditions in this entire range area. (Tr. 226, 231) 
The forage gro\Ying along the north side of Little 
\"alley \\Tould gro\v earlier in the season than that 
along its south canyon \vall, \Yith differ~nt species gro\v-
ing on different sides, ( Tr. 158, 139) all of "Thich could 
be grazed as the sheep satisfied their changing needs 
for forage in n1oving back and forth fro1n the \Yater 
at the Inouth of Little \ 1 alley on the lake shore to the 
feeds up through Little \Talley and do\Yn to different 
feeds on the ea~t side of the 1nountain ( Tr. 13S~ 159, 
1G2, ~25). It provided a natural salt feed for the liYe-
~tock so that in ~eenring this, it eli1ninated the necessity 
of feeding then1 salt ( Tr. 1G:2) . 
.r\ll these advantages are no\\T destroyed by the ex-
18 
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('.UYation "·hi<·h appellant gouged frou1 tlltl "Tide bottou1 
of thi~ long ran yon (Ex. 1, 5, G, 7). Tht1 YPry renter of 
thi~ eanyon, fron1 "\Vall to canyon "\Yall, "Tas dug out b.'T 
appellant ( Tr. 171, 178, Ex. 5, G, 7) in the ereation of 
it~ ;~:~5-a<'re gravel pit ( Tr. 205) ''"·hich i~ t\\To 1nile~ 
long ( Tr. 155). 1-{euloval of the sand and gravel destroyed 
thP forage gTo\\·ing on the land for all tiu1e ( 'l1 r. ~:1fi, 
;~;~~~' 171). Xo 1nore can this biggest and best forage-
producing canyon in the entire range ( Tr. 151) be used 
a~ a grazing or as a lautbing range, because sheep cannot 
and \\Till not go this long distance "Tithout feed through 
this gravel pit to reach range on the different ~ide.-: 
of the n1ountain ( Tr. 162, 16±, 178, 211). Thi~ only 
source of fresh "·ater can no longer be used to service 
livestock to utilize the \vide forage area through Little 
\ .. alley and beyond as \vas done before the pit \vas dug. 
The range on the east side of the 1nountain is no"\v 
segregated frou1 the range on the \vest side of the Inoun-
tain ( Tr. 161, 162, 178, 211). 
The high, perpendicular banks of this excavation are 
very dangerous to the lives of sheep \vhieh n1ight try 
to graze the fringe lands left in this canyon. Considerable 
numbers of sheep, up to a thousand at a tin1e, have 
been kno\vn to be frightened or other\\Tise caused to 
plunge over banks of the kind left by appellant in thi~ 
pit and be killed err. 16-1-, 1G6, ~o:-3, 208, 228, 2:-30). Thj ~ 
condition i~ also dangerous to herders of the flock~. 
particularly at night and in the slipper~~ \Y'eather of 
"Tinter ( Tr. 16;)). This dangerous condition could he 
corrected at a cost of $28,000.00 ( Tr. :207-8). hut even 
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if this were done it would not correct the fact that 
' 
sheep would not use this area to get back and forth 
from one side of the mountain to the other, because 
no forage \Vill grow in these pits (Tr. 168, 170-171), and 
it is too far for them to travel through the barren pits 
to reach forage. (Tr. 162, 164, 178, 211) 
To try to use Little Valley again with ewes and 
la1nbs "\vould only result in the death of many of the 
sheep by falling over the banks ( Tr. 164, 203, 208, 228, 
230) and \Yould only result in the making of many "bum" 
or orphan lambs "\vhich are practically \Yorthless (Tr. 
163-4). And this has been an excellent lambing ground 
(Tr. 159, 160, 198, 213). 
Little \:alley \Yill not again be available as the pass-
ageway for livestock in utilizing the ranges on either 
side of the mountain (Tr. 16:2, 164, 178, :211). The Little 
\:alley canyon and the area from \vhich appellant nrined 
out the sand and gravel had the sa1ne relationship to 
the lands of Mrs. Arthur and }Irs. Hunter as it had to 
those of l\1:r. Chournos ( Tr. 170). For all period of 
ti1ne Chournos has grazed, trailed and traveled through 
this Little \'alley in his liYestock operations upon all of 
the lands contained therein, \vhich \\~as the san1e for 
the Sheehans and their lessee operations (Tr. 177). 
The re1naining lands of these respondents are less 
valuable as a result of this destruction of Little \..,.alley 
by appellant. The lands of ~[rs. Hunter and )[rs ... A .. rthur 
had been leased for an annual rental of $7~000 per year 
at the tiu1e appellant took possession of then1 and began 
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its railroad project ( rrr. 170, 191). They have been dain-
aged to the extent of 20% to 25% of their former value 
or to the extent of 20% to 25% of $7,000 yearly (Tr. 
171, 172) or to the total extent of $28,000.00 to $35,000.00 
on a per1nanen t basis ( Tr. 184, 186, 188, 192, 195, 197, 
206, 207), vvhich is capitalizing the annual damage on 
a ~0-year basis (Tr. 173, 174, 175, 231). 
The Chournos lands were damaged in an even more 
serious \Yay than is the case with the Sheehan lands, 
since he owns a much greater acreage than is owned by 
the Sheehan sisters (Ex. 1, Tr. 144-45) and all of \\·hich 
has been used for many years in one unified sheep 
operation in which the Little Valley and the Promontory 
I\[ountain lands contributed an important use (Tr. 146, 
185). From the standp-oint of his Promontory Mountain 
lands, standing apart from his other holdings, his dam-
age \vas not less than that for Mrs. Hunter and Mrs. 
Arthur ( Tr. 185-6, 195, 197, 203, 206-7). 
Appellant had entered into a contract with Del H. 
Adams to pay a total of $100,000 for the taking of ma-
terial from the lands of Thir. Adams within this Little 
\"'"alley (Tr. 314, 320, 321, 326, 332, 343), and although 
the contract provided for payment at the rate of 2 
1nills per yard, Thfr. Adams had been convinced that 
this contract vvould provide him a pay1nent in the total 
sun1 of $100,000 for the sand and gravel to be taken 
fron1 his lands ( Tr. 321, 326, 343). He was also to receive 
$2500 per year for the period the appellant \Yas occu-
pying his lands \Yhile building the project, for the 
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nuisance or inconvenience to his livestock operations ( Tr. 
336, 321, 322). The jury awarded Mr. Chournos $3200 
for the one year appellant similarly interfered \Yith his 
operations \vhile building its project and after taking 
posession of his property in addition to the $32,000 
a\Yarded to him as permanent severance da1nage ( Tr. 
362).- An identical per1nanent severance a\Yard "~as n1ade 
in the Hunter-Arthur case (Tr. 361). 
STATE!1ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. . 
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW WERE FREE FROM ER-
ROR WITH RESPE<:~T TO THE VALUATION OF RESPOND-
ENTS' GRAVEL DEPOSITS. 
(a) THE EVIDENCE BELOW AS TO THE VALUE OF 
RESPONDENTS' GRAVEL DEPOSITS WAS PROPER 
AND COMPETENT TO SUPPOR'T THE VERDICT OF 
THE JURY. 
(b) THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY 
THE COURT BELOW IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
OTHER SALES. 
(c) ADMISSION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION CON-
TAINED IN NOTES ON PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2 WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIA.L AND ANY ERROR IN CONNE·C-
TION THEREWITH HAS BEEN WAIVED. 
(d) THE PROPER MEASURE OF \TALU.ATION IS THE 
FAIR MARI{E'T VALUE OF THE RESPONDENTS' 
GRAVEL DEPOSITS SEPARATELY EVALUATED. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE 
JURY THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS' 
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REI\JIAINING LANDS AND THE VERDICTS RETURNED 
THEREON ARE SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT AND COl\1-
PETENT EVIDENCE. 
(a) · THE TESTilVIONY CLEARLY S H 0 W S THAT 
THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING THE 
LANDS WHI·CH WERE DESTROYED BY APPELLANT 
IN EXCAVATING THE GREAT PIT FROM THE FLOOR 
OF THE LITTLE VALLEY CANYON; AND APPELLANT 
0 B J E C T E D TO RESPONDENTS' QUESTIONS DE-
SIGNED TO POINT .UP CLEARLY THE UNAVAILA-
BILITY OF OTHER LANDS. 
(b) THE DAMAGES AWARDED BELOW FOR THE 
DEPRECIA·TION IN THE VALUE OF THE RESPOND-
ENTS' RElVIAINING LANDS WERE PROPER UNDER 
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
(i) The Award Below for Damages to Respondents' 
Remaining Lands Can Be Proper1y Sustained as Proper 
"Consequential Damages" As That Term Is Used Herein. 
(ii) 'The Award Below for Damages to Respondents' 
Remaining Lands Can Be Sustained as Proper "Sever-
ance Damages" As That Term Is Used Herein. 
(c) THE DAMAGES AWARDED BELOW TO RESPOND-
ENTS' REI\1AINING LANDS WERE FOR THE DEPRE-
CIATION IN ·THE VALUE OF THOSE LANDS AND 
NOT L 0 S S E S TO THE BUSINESS ·CONDUCTED 
THEREON. 
(d) THE DAMAGES AWARDED TO RESPONDENTS' 
REMAINING LANDS WERE NOT THE RESULT OF 
ADDING VALUES FOR THE DIFFERENT USES OF 
TIIE LANDS TAKEN. 
(e) THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF RECORD 
UPON WHICH THE JURY PROPERLY BASED THEIR 
FINDING OF DAMAGES ·TO RESPONDENTS' REl\1AIN-
ING LANDS. 
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POINT III. 
BASED ON THE COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF RECORD, 
IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE VERDICT BELOW WAS 
EXCESSIVE AND THE RESUIJT OF PASSION AND PREJU-
DI·CE. 
POIN'T IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
PAYMENT OF THE JUDGMENT EN'TERED BELOW IN 
CASE NO. 8192 TO BE HELD IN ABEYAN·CE PENDING 
THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHALLENGE BY THE 
UNITED STA'TES TO THE VALIDITY OF RESPONDENTS' 
MINING CLAIMS. 
ARGl~~IEXT AKD Al~THORITIES 
POINT I. 
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW WERE FREE FROM ER-
ROR WITH RESPE·CT TO THE VALUATION OF RESPOND-
ENTS' GRAVEL DEPOSITS. 
(a) THE EVIDENCE BELOW AS TO THE 'r ALUE OF 
RESPONDENTS' GRAVEL DEPOSITS 'VAS PROPER 
AND COMPETENT TO SUPPOR'T THE VERDICT OF 
THE JURY. 
Each of the four \\Titnesses (Storey~ Gibbons, Fife 
and Ford) \vho ''rere called belo\Y in behalf of the re-
spondents and \Vho expressed an opinion as to the 1narket 
value in place of the graYel deposits \Yith \Yhieh \Ye are 
here concerned, fixed a fair 1narket Yalne on such de-
posits at 5c per cubic yard ( Tr. ~9, 31, -1-G, GS, 100). The 
jury· returned a Yerdict in the case of each respondent 
deter1nining such value to have been 3c per cubic yard 
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( Tr. 361-362). Three of these ''.:itnesses, Gibbons, Fife 
and Ford, "\Vere then actuall~v engaged in the general 
contracting and sand and gravel business and repre-
sented a cornbined experience in the Idaho-l~tah-Nevada 
area in that business of nearly 65 years (Tr. -!1, G4, 90). 
The only contrary evidence "\\'as that adduced fron1 
the sole "\Yitness called in behalf of appellant, narnely, 
l\Ir. Bagley, the project-engineer for J\!Iorrison-Knudson 
Cornpany, the very company having the ocntract for 
the construction of the project here involved and for 
"\vhom appellant condemned respondents' gravel deposits 
( Tr. 290, 292), ''"' ho prior to his employ1nen t by l\Iorrison-
l(nudson purchased fill material upon only one prior 
occasion ( Tr. 293). His estimate as to the market value 
of respondents' deposits was two mills per cubic yard 
(Tr. 300), or nearly 1/25 of the value fixed by Mr. 
Storey, ~Ir. Gibbons, Mr. Fife and Mr. Ford. 
In addition to the opinions expressed to the jury 
by respondents' expert witnesses, respondents presented 
to the jury evidence of other comparable sales of fill 
rnaterial. Defendants' Exhibit 2 reflected the price paid 
per ton and per cubic yard by Gibbons & Reed Con-
struction Company for gravel deposits belonging to 
third parties (Tr. 61) from the year 1953 to 1959, and 
sho"\Yed a range of 2c per ton to 6c per ton. On the 
converted basis of cubic yards ( 1 en bic yard of gravel 
is a pproxirna tely 3,000 pounds, or 1 1j2 tons) ( Tr. 59), 
this price range "\vould then be fron1 approximately 
3c per cubic yard to as high as 9c per cubic yard. This 
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exhibit further Teflected sales fron1 remote pit areas 
near Wells, Carlin, and Ely, Nevada, and Dunsmui~, 
California at a price of 3-1/3 cents per ton, or approxr-
nlately 4.9c per cubic yard. 
Witness lTord further testified that fill purchased 
near Soda Springs, Idaho, an area as ren1otely situated 
as Prornontory (Tr. 98, 100) \vas 5c per ton or an Bequiva-
lent to about six or seven cents a yard." (Tr. 109) 
Witness Parsons ranged his prices from 1%c to Sc 
( Tr. 137, 138) per cubic yard for gravel purchased frorn 
undeveloped areas ( Tr. 1-11) in X orthern and \\~estern 
1Ttah (Tr. 137). 
It \Yas sho\vn that the State of Ltah leased un-
developed gravel pits even in ren1ote areas for frorn 1 %c 
to 5c per eubic yard (Tr .. 1:2±) and leased gravel in 
Section 36, a desolate and inaccessible area on Prornon-
tory for 1lj2c per cubic yard prior to the construction 
activity in that area ( Tr. 123). 
\\Titness Brannner, called in behalf of re~pondent~~ 
testified that, as a result of an anayl~is perforrned 
upon sarnples of re~pondents~ graveL it \Yas hi~ opinion 
that said gravel \YH8 ~uitable for concrete aggregatr 
and cornpared favorabl~~ "Tith gravel taken fron1 devel-
oped pit area~ in the Salt Lake \Talley ( 1.,r. 88. S-1-). 
De~pite the over\Yhehning evidence of record to sup-
port a vPrdiet of 3e per cubic yard for re~pondent~, 
gravPl deposit~, appellant no\Y insists that the only 
cornpetent Pvidence of value "-as that offered by the 
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Halaried eu1plo~·ee o.f ~lorrison-l(nnd~on. (\nnpan~·, Jlr. 
l3agle~·, to "·it: ~/lOth eE·nt~ per cubic yard. It i~ di~­
('PrnihlP fro1n the tone of appellant'~ ('l'O~~ exruninatioa 
and appellant'~ brief that appellant'~ position is based 
upon the thPor~~ that inas1nuch as there \\·a~ no read)· 
1narket for respondents' 1naterial~ in October of 1957 
and ,.J nne of 1 D;),~, the valuation placed thereon i~ based 
upon future, re1note and speculative uses. 
T'hi~ case presL~nts a soule\\·hat curious and unu~ual 
situation. \Y e are here involved ,,·ith a co1n1nodity, 
~nitable and adaptable, both in qualit)· and quantit~·, for 
concrete aggregate, fill purposes, roadbed eoncrete, anrl 
all the n1any uses to \vhich gravel frou1 ahnost an)· 
source in this State or else\vhere n1a-y be put (Tr. 4D, 
73, 83, 93, 13±). It is contended, how·ever, hy appellant 
that this conunodity \Vas valueless because situated in 
a ren1ote area and far fro1n ''1narket," the haulage cost 
thereof 1naking its eonnnercial use econo1nicall)· in-
feasible. ( Testin1on)· \vas elicited to sho\v the prohibitive 
rate of shipping this n1aterial to Brighan1 City ( Tr. 71).) 
This argtunent overlooks a fact that beco1nes ap-
parent upon reading the record as a ''"·hole. That fact 
i~ that gravel deposits seen1 to fall into t\vo rather 
distinet ea tegories ( Tr. 142). The first are those clepo~i ts 
in established developed gravel pits elose to centers uf 
'"1narket." Gravel situated thusly can de1nand a price 
of up\vards of 95c per ton ( rrr. 71) or, on a converted 
price, $1.371/2 per cubic yard. The second are those de-
posits \vhich lie in their undeveloped state, situated in 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ren1ote places far from "market'' centers and which 
achieve commercial importance because of their availa-
bility for a particular project which has come into exist-
ence in the vicinity (Tr. 133, 139, 140, 141, 142, 65 ). 
Gravel deposits so situated have dem~nded any\vhere 
from ly2 c to Sc per cubic yard, as illustrated above, 
albeit that at the completion of the project the pit that 
has been opened by the contractor may be dormant 
for commercial purposes for a period thereafter (Tr. 
62). An in1mediate present market and demand for 
gravel in the latter category nevertheless exists, ho"\v-
ever brief, when a project comes into existence; and a 
fair price range for such gravel l1as been established 
in the market therefor. 
It is clear, of course, that the gravel deposits 'vith 
which we are here concerned, fall "~ithin the second 
category above indicated. This is, of course, "\vhat 'vas 
intended by }fr. Gibbons "~hen he testified in reply to 
appellant's cross examination that he \Yould pay 5r a 
cubic ~~ard if he had the contract to construct the project 
for appellant~ that is, by reason of the nature of the 
gravel deposit in the instant ease. the fair Yalue thereof 
as an undeveloped deposit aYailable~ accessible and 
adaptable to use in a project "\Yhieh has ''co1ne into being" 
in the iunnediate vicinit~T is 3e per cubic. yard. This 
also, it is sub1nitted, is the fair intendnH?nt of the testi-
lllon.v of the other three "~itnesst--.s called by respondents 
"\vho fixed a Inarket value upon respondents~ properties. 
Appellant contends, ho,vever, that in fixing the Yalue 
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of re~podent~' gravel, \\'e n1ust ignore the ""111arket" or 
dentand ereated b~, the project in existence in the vicini-
ty, sinee this is the very project for '''lrich respondents' 
deposits are sought in these conden1nation proceedings. 
It 1uay be adntitted that this is the rule in some juris-
dietions of this country. The rule, ho,vever, to which 
the courts of this state are no\Y conunitted is that any 
fact in existence on the date as of \vhich co1npensation 
is to be deter1nined * \Yhich \Yould influence the value of 
the property to be taken, includin,r; the existence of 
the public project involved, may be properly considered 
in ascertaining that value. ~Phis Court in the very recent 
case of Weber Basin Conservancy District v. Ward, e! 
al., ______ Utah 2d ______ , 347 P. 2d 862, 863 (1Ttah 1959) 
in replying to the contention that the value of the 
property taken is to be ascertained without regard to 
the fact that the condemnor has entered the market 
stated as follovvs: 
BThe plaintiff urges the view adopted by 
so1ne courts that the value of the property for 
condemnation purposes should be detern1ined 
\Yithout consideration for the fact that the con-
demnor has entered the market and plans im-
provements. The argun1ent supporting such rule 
appears to be that the condemnee should not be 
allo\Yred an advantage from the fact that the con-
den1nor is improving the area and the latter be 
required to pay a higher price and thus in effect 
suffer a penalty because of its O\Yn improvements. 
>~:Summons in each case was served approximately 10 days prior 
to actual occupancy, which latter date \vas adopted by the court, 
upon the stipulation of counsel, as the date as of ·which compensa-
tion was to be determined (Tr. 27). 
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The contrary vie\V is that erninent domain stat-
utes are designed only to give the condemnor 
the power to purchase property "Thether the con-
demnee desires to sell or not, but are not purposed 
to give the condemnor a~y superior ba:gaining 
position as to price. vV e are in accord With what 
appears to be the better vie,v, adopted by the 
trial court that the condernnee is entitled to the 
' fair rnarket value of his property at the tin1e 
of the service of sum1nons in the condemnation 
proceedings as provided by statute; and that all 
factors bearing upon such value that any pru-
dent purchaser \vould take into account at that 
time should be given consideration ... " (Empha-
sis supplied.) 
The \Yisdonl of this rule is den1onstrated Yividly 
\Yhen vie\V in the light of the circun1stances of the in-
stant case. It is conceded that it is not the policy of 
the la\\· to require a conden1nor to pay Hhold up .. prices 
for properties "'needed" for the public project involved; 
~Tet, neither is it the policy of the la\\T to sacrifice the 
rights of the individual to the extent that the lando\vner 
1nust sell less than the ··going rate~' sin1ply because the 
purehaser i~ the conden1nor. Rather it is the policy of 
the la\v to place both conden1nor and lando\vner in 
the position of t hP hypothetical \Yilling buyer and \\Till-
ing seller, neither acting under co1npulsion. 
rrhe eviden('p is clear and over\\Thehning that the 
value of respondents~ gTHYPl deposit in an undeveloped 
state, situated as it i8~ in a re1note area, but aYailable, 
adaptable, aeeessihle and desirable for n8e in an existing 
project ( Tr. 30:2, 305) in the vicinity \\Tas 3e per cubic 
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~·ard. rrhe eonelusion is ineseapahle in vie\\·ing their 
tPstinH>ny a~ a "·hole that each of th~ contractor~ called 
h)~ respondents belo,,· \Yould have paid that au1ount a~ 
a fair 1narket prieP if any one of theu1 \YPre engaged 
in the construction of a ~i1nilar project in the area. ThP 
jury has deter1nined that the price that one \\'ho \Yould 
"·illingl~· pay one \Yho \vould \villingly ~ell \vas 3c per 
euhie yard. 
By \\·hat 1nanner of logir can \Ye no\\· say that a p-
pellant should not be required to pay the sa1ne price 
that an~· other person \vould be required to pay for 
respondents' property under the san1e circun1stane~~ ~ 
It is funda1nental that appellant is entitled to no 1norP 
advantageous consideration, nor no less, than any other 
person 1nerely because it is the conde1nnor. The fact 
that the legislature has conferred upon appellant the 
po\ver of e1ninent do1nain does not relieve it of the 
obligation to pay that au1ount \\·hich another, not so 
favorably endo\\·ed h:· statute, \Yould be \Yilling to pa~\· 
if engaged in the construction of a si1nilar project in 
the sa1ne vicinity. This, then, n1ust be the test of 1narket 
value in this or any other land da1nage case : That 
an1ount "·hich a \Villing buyer \vould pay and for \vhich 
a \villing seller \\·ould sell respondents' gravel under the 
circtnnstances as they existed in October of 1957 and 
J nnP of 1958. If by definition, under the cii'C'lnnstance~ 
of this ease, a ·',Y'illing buyer" is one engaged in the 
construction of a project in the neighborhood, appellant 
~hould not be heard to co1nplain, since it is placed in 
the ~an1e position as any other H\villinp; buyer" on 
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those dates and under those circumstances, no more -
' 
no less. 
It is sub1nitted, therefore, that the value placed on 
respondents' materials by respondents' witnesses is nei-
ther a fut ... re nor speculative one, but based upon a fair 
price that a purchaser would be willing to pay under 
all the circumstances existing as of the valuation dates 
referred to. 
(b) THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY 
THE COURT BELOW IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
OTHER SALES. 
Appellant urges that prejudicial error \Yas com-
mitted by the trial court in allowing testin1ony and 
evidence of other sales to be presented to the jury by 
~fr. Gibbons and ~Ir. Ford. )!r. Gibbons testified re-
garding purchases made by his con1pany as reflected 
upon Exhibit 2 (Tr. 58, 59) and indicated that these 
were purchases made fro1n third parties or supplied 
by the O\Yner during the period covered ( Tr. 61). The 
Exhibit itself reflects, inter alia, the o\vner~ the location 
and nan1e of the project inYolYed and the year of re-
moval. Gibbons' testin1ony indicates that in each instance, 
the purchase \Yas 1nade for the specific project and no 
subsequent purchase n1ade after co1npletion fron1 the 
particular source involved ( Tr. 61, 6:2). 
l\lr. Ford testified regarding a specific purchase 
1nade at Soda Springs, Idaho, in Septe1nber of the Year 
195-1- (Tr. 98), fro1n an area that as in the ins.tant 
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ea~e, \vas re1notely situated ( Tr. 100) and in ··which, a8 
in the instant case, the gravel deposit lie in an undevel-
opPd state requiring a pit to be opened by the purchaser 
(Tr. 98, 99). 
As to \vhere the Court is to dra\v the line in vie,,~ 
of the peculiar nature and situation of the coininodity 
taken in this case involves practical considerations, 
vveighing in the balance the possible degree of dissimi-
larity and confusion of issues as against the assistance 
this evidence furnishes the jury in arriving at a fair 
value to be paid. As stated in 5 Nichols on E1ninent 
Do1nain, ( 3rd Ed.), 275 §21.3: 
"The question whether such evidence shall be 
adn1itted does not depend upon any fundamental 
principle of the la\v of evidence, but is a purely 
practical one, depending upon whether there is 
a net gain or loss to the orderly and expeditious 
administration of justice in land damage cases 
by the use of such evidence." 
It is significant that appellant's counsel sought 
belo\v to restrict such evidence only to sales occurring 
precisely at the "promontory area" (Tr. 57). Such a-. 
vie\v under the circumstances of this case vvould be un-
real and unduly harsh and unfair on respondents. As 
stated in 5 Nichols, id., §21.3, and quoted \vith approval 
in State r. Peek) 1 1~tah 2d. 263, 265 P. 2d 630, 637: 
"It is evident that there may be considerable 
difference in the size, shape, situation and im-
n1ediate surroundings of tV\ro estates, and perhaps 
in other respects, and yet the price \vhich one 
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brought 1nay be of substantial assis.tance In de-
termining the value of the other." 
Again at 5 Nichols, id. 280-281, §21.31: 
"Similarity does not mean identical, but h~v­
ing a resen1blance. Obviously, no t\VO properties 
can be exactly alike, and no general rule c~n be 
laid down regarding the degree of similarity that 
must exist to make such evidence admissable. 
It must necessarily vary with the circumstances 
of each particular case. Whether the properties 
are sufficiently similar to have some bearing on 
the value under consideration, and to be of any 
aid to the jury, 1nust necessarily rest largely in 
the sound discretion of the trial court, which will 
not be interfered \Yith unless abused. The exa,ct 
lim~ts, either of si1nilarity or difference, or of 
nearness or remoteness in point of thne, is d-i_f.fi-
cu.Zt, if not i1npossible, to prescribe by any arbi-
trary rule, but nzust to a large e:rtent depend on 
tlze location and the character of the property 
and the circunzstances of the case. It is to be 
considered 1rith reference to tlze light tlzTo,zcn o·n 
the issue, and not as a nzere rnetlzod of ra·i:siLng 
a 1 ega 1 puzzle.·· ( En1phasis supplied.) 
Our Supreu1e 'Court in State r. Peele supra. has stated: 
Hllo·w·ever, to be adn1issable there must be a 
si1nilari ty bet\\~een the t\\~o properties, even 
though they do not have to be identical in size 
or shape or pos8ible use8, but there n1ust be 
~ufficient 8iinila rity in these respects and in 
proxi1nit~~ in tin1e of sale and the location of 
the propertie8 to satisfy the trial fudge that such 
erideucc 1cill be helpful to the fury i·n detet·Jnini.ng 
the value of the property Pn questio·n. This is a 
prelin1inar~~ question for the trial judge to de-
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terlltinP before ~ueh eYidPIH'P i~ aduti~~ahle, and 
his deterutination should be follo,ved by the ap-
pellate eourt in the absence of an abuse of dis-
cretion." (En1phasis supplied.) 
It i~ ~uhutittPd that under the cirelllll~tanees of thi~ 
<·n~P the as~istanee giYen to the jury in fixing the value 
of respondents' gravel by the evidence addueed of other 
sales 'vas inestin1able and that the adutission of the sau1e 
"·a~ in the sound exereise of the trial eourt's diseretion. 
(c) ADMISSION OF CER'TAIN INFORMATION CON-
TAINED IN NOTES ON PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2 WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL AND ANY ERROR IN CONNE·C-
TION THEREWITH HAS BEEN WAIVED. 
In eonnection 'vith Exhibit :2, appellant assign:--: 
the faet that said Exhibit contains t'Yo HN ote~'' at tluJ 
bottou1 thereof a~ an additional reason for the alleged 
objectionable nature of the l~xhibit (See pages 21, :2:2 
of Appellant's brief). 
It is significant to note that appellant's eounsrl 
helo"? objected to the Exhibit as a \vhole and for the 
express reason that it referred to sales of gravel not 
ulocated on l)rOlllOntory." (Tr. 57) At no tiule did he 
direct the attention of the court to the particular portion 
of the Exhibit \Yhich appellant no\\'" con1plains of: and 
it is subn1itted that he 1uay not no\v raise this particular 
objection for the first tin1e on appeal. 
~[oreoYel', in vie\v of the co1npelling and over\vhehn-
ing co1npetent evidence establishing value \vhich the jury 
had before it. any error of the court in failing to strike 
fron1 Exhibit ~ the t\vo HX otes" referred to1 if error 
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there be, was harmless. It is submitted that it cannot 
be seriously contended that there was a reasonable like-
lihood of a different result below, had the "Notes" been 
stricken. 
It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that 
'v~1ere there is abundant competent evidence to establish 
the fact sought to be proved, admission of improper 
evidence does not constitute prejudicial error. Rule 61, 
U.R.C.P.; Baird v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 49 L"tah 58, 
162 Pac. 79, 83. 
(d) THE PROPER MEASURE OF VALUATION IS THE 
FAIR MARKEIT VALUE OF THE RESPONDENTS' 
GRAVEL DEPOSITS SEPARATELY EVALUATED. 
Inasmuch as the valuation fixed below \Yas upon the 
basis of a fixed price per unit of the gra-\el deposits 
here involved, and not the fair n1arket Yalue of the land 
in \\Thich these gravel deposits \Yere situate, respondents 
feel it is· encun1bent upon then1 to Yery briefly indicate 
to the court that the rneasure adopted \Yas the proper 
measure. 
Although appellant has not raised any issue in this 
connection, but indeed furnished testi1nony as to Yalua-
tion also on a fixed price per unit (2/lOc per cubic yard), 
in light of the recent decision of this court in the case 
of State of Utah l'. v/ able, 6 lTtah :2d 40~ 305 P.:2d 495, it 
is felt that it should be den1onstrated to the court that 
the instant case falls "Tithin a \\Tell recognized exception 
to the general principles laid do,Yn in the Noble case. 
In the Noble ease this court 'Yas of the opinion that 
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the evidence in the record as to valuation ,,·a~ based 
upon a eo1nputation of the a1nount of gravel and rock 
1nultiplied by the net profit that could be derived fron1 
the 1narketing thereof. This court there held that such 
evidence \\·as not con1petent because although the quality, 
quantity, and extent of the gravel deposit situate upon 
the land sought to be condemned was an element to be 
eonsidered in assessing the rnarket value of the land, 
it \Ya~ not the yardstick thereof. In the instant casP, 
unlike the Noble case, the mineral deposit itself vvas 
actually the subject of the condemnation rather than 
the lands in \Yhich the minerals are situate. The 1neasure 
of value to be applied must of necessity, therefore, be 
a different one. It 'vas, therefore, proper in the instant 
case to separately evaluate the gravel deposit. 
± Nichols Eminent Do1nain, id., 244, § 13.22 states 
the general rule announced in theN oble case as follo":s: 
"However, vvhile the profits, price or value 
of the n1inerals, taken separately, may not be con-
sidered, yet the value, extent and quality of such 
n1inerals as exist upon the land 1nay be consider-
ed." 
Xichols goes on to state that there is a \Yell recognized 
exception to this general rule ( 2-tG, § 13.22 [1]) : 
HThe second exception to the general rule i~ 
applied \Yhere the 1nineral deposit itself is the 
subject of the condemnation. In such case the 
deposit is treated as so 1nuch 1nerchandise rather 
than land. The rule applicable to personal prop-
erty is invoked and the conden1nor is liable for 
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the 1narket value of the mineral deposit as sepa-
rately evaluated." 
The same rule was applied in the K e\V ~Iexico case, 
The Board of Cuunty Cornrnissioners v. Good, 4-± N.NL 
495, 105 P. 2d 470, in which condemnation proceedings 
were insti t~-: ted seeking to conden1n certain lands belong-
ing to Good for the purpose of securing rock, sand, gravel 
and caliche for use upon a public high,vay. The trial 
court submitted to the jury the acreage value of the land 
taken, whereas Good clai1ned that he ''Tas entitled to sho-w 
the n1arket value of the 1ninerals. taken as separately 
evaluated. The Supren1e Court of X ew J!exico held that 
this action of the trial court \vas error and reversed the 
case ·w·ith instructions stating as follo,vs: 
"Appellant had the right to have the jury hear 
the evidence and detern1ine the actual 1narket 
value of the caliche rock taken fron1 his land "ith-
out reference to the value of the land itself ***. 
''It 1nay be doubted 'vhether appellant offered 
to produce very satisfactory proof as to such Inar-
ket value, as distinguished fron1 the Yalue of the 
land itself, but that "\vould be a question for the 
jury. It "\vould go to the ''"'"eight and not to the 
adn1issibility of the evidence." 
~rhe rulP is si1nilarly stated in the annotation con-
tained at 156 .:\.L.R. 1419, "·herein it is stated: 
"Certainli1nitations of this general rule follo'v 
directly fro1n the sta te1nent of the rule itself. 
YVhere the eonde1nna tion proceeding is concerned 
"·ith a use of the land "'"hich leaves the 1uineral 
deposits untouched or "·here, on the other hand 
onl)· the 1ninerals are taken and the land re1nain~ 
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in the O\vner'~ pos~e~~ion, the general rule \vill 
a ppa rentl~· heconH• inapplicable.,. 
l t i~. therefore, ~nl11nitted, "·ithout cli~pute hy appel-
lant, that inn~tuuch a~ appellant sought her·e not to con-
deinn the land itself, but rather a right of "Tay for the 
purpo~P of extracting respondents' graYel deposit, that 
the trial court belo\Y applied the proper IneaHure of Ynhu.} 
in thi~ C'a~e. that i~, the gravel deposit separately evalu-
ated. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUBl\:IITTED TO THE 
JURY 'THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS' 
RElVIAINING LANDS AND THE VERDICTS RETURNED 
THEREON ARE SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT AND COlVI-
PETENT EVIDENCE. 
(a) THE ·TESTIMONY CLEARLY S H 0 W S THAT 
THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING THE 
LANDS WHI·CH WERE DESTROYED BY APPELLANT 
IN EXCAVATING THE GREAT PIT FROl\1 THE FLOOR 
OF THE LITTLE VALLEY CANYON; AND APPELLANT 
0 B J E C T E D TO RESPONDENTS' QUESTIONS DE-
SIGNED TO POINT UP CLEARLY THE UNAVAILA-
BILITY OF OTHER LANDS. 
The only question presented by appellant under thi~ 
subdivision of its brief is \Yhether '"respondents failed 
to produce co1npetent evidence that other sinrilar land~ 
\Yere unavailable." 
... ~ppellant urges the court to Tecognize that the 
Chournos lands conden1ned h~T appellant ''"·hich are in-
volved in the severance R\\Tard case (lo\Yer court K o. 8191) 
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were, at the time of suit, isolated by distances up to six 
miles from his other grazing lands on Promontory by 
property of others. The facts are otherwise. In its brief, 
appellant refers to "the 40-acre tract taken for gravel in 
the Chournos case." In this particular case, there was a 
total of 200 acres of land area involved in appellant's tak-
ing, 160 acres of which land are in Section 13, which is 
south of Little Valley, and with which parcel we were not 
directly concerned in the severance a\vard problems. Th8 
other 40-acre tract was located in Little \ 1 alley and \vas 
part of an 80-acre tract owned by respondents. The 
sand and gravel condemned and taken by appellant here 
\Yas from the NWl!tSE 1ft of Section 6, T. 6 X., R. 5 \V., 
SLM. The facts are and the evidence clearly- sho\ved that 
Chournos also o\vned, at all times herein, the immediate 
contiguous parcel, the NE 1ft SE 1ft of the sa1ne section 
(Ex. 1), making up the 80-acre tract. 
An exan1ination of Exhibit 1 sho\YS the o\vnership 
of the lands \Yithin the entire area involYed ( Tr. 1-±, 16, 
17, 18, 19). That 1nap sho\vs that the SO-acre tract (X% 
SE 1ft of Section 6, above to\vnship) is contiguous along 
its entire south boundary for one-half 1nile to public do-
lnain \\Thich extends due south for one and one-quarter 
miles and that this public do1nain area extends also into 
the \\Test half of this Section 7 \\Thich is directly south of 
the said Section 6. The testin1on:~ also sho\YS \Yithout 
COTitradietion that 1\Jr. (;hournOS is the onl~T perSOll quali-
fied and JH\riuitted to graze these public lands (Tr. 176-
77, 1S6). The said 1nap exhibit also sho\\Ts that the above 
80-aere tract corners upon lands O\vned b:T respondent 
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Chournos along the south tier of forties in the adjacent 
section 5. And this is contiguous to approxirnately 5,000 
acres of Chournos-owned lands located in the upper part 
of Little \Talley and in the eastern and southern part of 
the Prornontory Mountain. Every part of this acreage 
is contiguous to Chournos-owned lands. If no rights exist 
in Chournos (and such a concession was never made) to 
trail across the Adams lands located in the Section 5 
directly east of the above said Section 6 (and the evidence 
is othervvise, Tr. 177, Ex. 1), it is clearly shovvn upon this 
1nap that a wide open and unobstructed vvay is available 
to Chournos to reach all of these lands from his said SO-
acre tract in the said Section 6 by going across the public 
domain to the south for any distance up to a mile and R 
half and then easterly into several thousand acres of his 
paten ted lands. 
As the said Exhibit n1ap indicates, it is necessary for 
l\Ir. Chournos in moving from the the above 5,000 acre 
area of his lands to cross only tvvo corners of sections 
of lands ovvned by Mrs. Arthur and 1\tfrs. Hunter in reach-
ing his additional 15,000 acres of lands located upon this 
one Prornontory :\fountain Unit of his range. It must 
readily be admitted that the 40 acres fron1 vvhich the sand 
and gravel \Vere removed in Little \Talley is not contigu-
ous to every other parcel of the Chournos holdings on 
Promontory. Respondents never contended such to be 
the case, and such need not be the situation in order to 
support a severance award. This element is treated in 
another division of this brief. 
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The testin1onv and evidence in this case 'vas plainly 
that Little \ ... alleY., served as the trail-,vay, the only road, 
the frequently u~ed and natural liYestock passage,Yay he-
tw·een the lands on the east and those on the """e:st side of 
the 1nountain ( Tr. 137, 13S, 159, 1G1, 162, 198, :21:2, :2:23, 
227), as 'vell as the biggest, best and 1nore excellent lainh-
ing range on the 1uountain (Tr. 148, 15-l-, 159, 160),_the 
route to the only live 'vater in this area 'vhere these sheep 
can drink in the dry fall and spring of the year 'Yhenever 
sno'Y is not aYailahle to n1eet this livestock need (Tr. 157, 
15S, 162, :215). It provided the easy, natural and conven-
ient ""ay for sheep to retreat to the safe ·w·inter range 
'vhen caught in the higher elevations by too deep ~no\YS 
Cfr. 156, 157, 226, 2~7, :228). It """as the safe and indis-
pensable link for livestock operations: holding the east 
side and the ,,~est side ranges together as one unified 
parcel of grazing lands (Ex. 1, Tr. 161, 162, 178, 211). 
rrhe evidence i~ abundant and convincing to the effect 
that all of the above n~e~ and purpo:'e:' to 'Yhich LittlP 
\""alley had heen put and \Yhich it had ~erved before the 
gaping hole 'Ya~ excavated, fron1 'Yall to ""all of the can-
yon and for t'Yo 111ile~ in length, 'Yere destroyed for all 
ti1ne b~ .. tlH~ appellant'~ ~and and gravel re1noval (Tr. 1G:2-
-l-, 171, J~~x. 5, (). 7). X ot only "~n~ that area and its nses and 
J'Plati onshi p~ to the reu1aining lands of the:'e re~pondent~ 
destro~"ed hut a ne"" ele1nent, never before present. \ra~ 
injPeted into this range area: a Yery ~erion~ and un-
natural ha/.ard "~a~ created and left by the appellant in 
thi~ oneP YPr~ .. ~afp and u~able piece of range ( T,r. G-1:-G). 
rrhi~ ]1<1/.Hl'Q j~ in the e:xtre1nely high~ Unstable and per-
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l_)(-_\ndieular 'valls left around the ::335-acre pit ( rrr. ~03, l·:x. 
3, 6, 7, 166). \\Thile this dangerous hazard rnay be eliini-
nated by sloping down these high and steep bank~, the cost 
thereof will approxin1ate $28,000.00, and even \vith this 
done, the range will remain forever \Yithout vegetation 
and will ren1ain destroyed so far as any of the above 
uses and purposes are concerned ( Tr. 168, 171, 207, 208). 
And the elilnination of this hazard \vhich never existed 
before \\'Ould not alleviate the severance da1nage \vhich 
appellant created (Tr. 161-66, 170-1). 
The phy8ical s~tuation as it exists \\Tith this high 
rocky 1nountain ridge dividing the east side and the ,,·e~t 
8ide lands, \vith no other roads and no other usahle passes 
to supply the 1neans for livestock to 1nove het\\·een th0 
t'vo, precludes the possibility, fro1n the physical stand-
point of securing other lands to supply the uses and pur-
poses in connection \vith the eontinued use of the relnain-
ing lands, \vhich the lands appellant destroyed onee 
served. Ex. 1, 5, 6, 7, Tr. 15±, 155, lGl, lG-±, 171, 178, ~11, 
3:Z(), 333). It is sub1nitted that, in this situation, \vherA 
the identical location of the land destroyed by the coin-
denor is the only location \vhich a tract of land could 
occup~· to 1neet the require1nents of the ren1aining lands 
of the defendant, the rule requiring proof that si1nilar 
lands are unavailable is satified, or is not applicable. 
_._-\ny other land \vhich 1night possibly serve the uses 
and purposes \vhich the land appellant destro~·p(l had 
served \vould have to contain "·ater for livestock to 1neet 
the needs of the \Vater \vhich the lake shore had furnished 
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for livestock use to enable them to reach the available 
forage from this water hole. The evidence sho\ved that 
there was no other water hole in this entire area to servic.e 
these particular forage lands. Lands re1noved by any 
substantial distance from this area, \vithout regard to 
hovv much water they 1night possibly contain, could not 
service this once important segment of range. l-; nder this 
situation, the ans\Yer to the question \Yhether substitute 
range is -available to satisfy all of the uses and relation-
ships \Yhich the lands destroyed once served is already 
obvious. 
Sand and gravel fron1 other lands or land areas 
111ight be available to replace that \vhich \Yas re1noved, 
and soil might conceivably be hauled in to fill up this huge 
pit in Little \-;alley to provide the needed fertile top-soil 
to support plant growth again. This is the only n1ethod 
by '"·hich other lands might be used to substitute for the 
lands destroyed. But this is un\vorthy of consideration 
not only because the cost of this replacen1ent "Tould be 
iH11neasurably beyond any an1ounts \rith "Thich W"e are 
involved here, but years " ... ould be required to acco1nplish 
this ilnpractical restoration of the ruined lands. 
rr1hP eon~irlera ble land area of the re~pondents had 
eonstituted one ~ingle, efficient and har1noniou~ly ftuv_·-
tioning \\'intPr g;razing; and ~heep lainbino· rano-e before 
< <- ~ ~ 
the connecting lands "Thich ~eryc~d to co1nbine the east and 
tht~ \\'Pst ~idP of tlH' Inounta in \rere destroyed by appel-
lant. But, h~· this dPstruetion of .Little ·\'"alle~T, for all 
l n·aetieal l>lll'}>O~<'~, the~e land <'11' 0 < .... ~ a.1·o 1 · 
'"· ~t. ' P lYSicall~T and 
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per1nanently divided and separated one fron1 the other 
so far as the livestock operations are concerned. The 
lands had been put to this use and to no other for many 
years. The fact that the tvvo land areas on either side 
of the 1nountain could be held together only by land par-
cels in the location of those \vhich appellant destroyed 
\\Tould see1n to clearly furnish all the proof required 
that substitute lands could not be available in this situa-
tion. 
i\ppellant neither requested an instruction to be 
given by the court to the jury relating to the availability 
or the unavailability of other lands, nor did it take any 
exception to the failure of the court to instruct the jury 
on this point. 
At one point in the trial where respondent endeavor-
ed to sun1marize the shovving that there \\Tas no other 
available land \vhich rnight be secured to replace the par-
cels destroyed in Little \Talley the appellant interfereJ 
\Yith and objected to that testimony (Tr. 17~). He, there-
fore, may not be heard to co1nplain that such factual in-
formation \vas not further developed. This court has re-
cently ruled on this point in Weber Basin Water Causer-
caney District v. Braegger, (No. 8835) as follo\vs: 
"The claim that the court's instructions as to 
severance damages \vas inadequate in its failure 
to include a proviso that defendants were dis-
entitled to such da1nages unless there was evidence 
sho,ving non-availability of cornparable land in the 
area, is ansvvered by plaintiff's successful objec-
tion to the introduction of such evidence, placing 
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plaintiff in no position to co1nplain that the in-
struction 'vas not given.'' 
(b) THE DAlVIAGES AWARDED BELOW FOR THE 
DEPRECIA·TION IN THE VALUE OF THE RESPOND-
ENTS' REMAINING LANDS WERE PROPER UNDER 
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES OF THE STATE 
OF U'TAH. 
_._L\ppellant attacks the a\\Tard belo'Y of da1nage~ forth~ 
depreciation in value of the respondents' re1naining lands 
upon the theory that such da1nage~ resulted fron1 ap-
pellant'~ operations upon lands not o'Yned by respondent~ 
and further, upon the theory that, in any event. such 
da1nages 'Yere not proper severance da1nages under tht> 
statutes and decisions of this State. 
The fallacy of this contention ""ill be 1nade apparent 
by de1nonstrating that the a\\-ards n1ade belo"- for danl-
ages to respondents' re1naining lands are properly sus-
tainable ""hether Yiew,.ed as so-called ~'consequential dan1-
ages" or as H~eYerance da1nages. ~~ 
Before proceeding to ~o de1nonstrate~ ho\\-ever~ a 
definition of ter111s~ for the sake of clarity~ appears to be 
in order. In eYery conden1nation proceeding "-herein 
da1nages to lands other than those taken are inYolYe(l. 
t\YO situations 111ay conceiYably arise: ( 1) That situation 
\\?hPrP part of a trart of land is physically appropriated. 
and ( ~) ~rhat situation \\"here fro1u public 'Yorks on lands 
o I' others dan1agt>s aecrue to a tract of land no part of 
\\?hi<'h is ~ken. ~- Ni<'hols on l~Ininent Do1nain~ (3rd Ed.). 
§ 14.1. r~,or the sa kP of convenience~ those da111agps accru-
lng 111 ~ihtntion. (l) "·ill he referred to in thi~ brief a~ 
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H~everance da1nages '' and those dau1ages accruing 1n 
situation ( :2) \vill be referred to in this brief as Hconse-
quential dan1ages." See 2 Kichols, id., § 6.4432. 
'l"'here is an i1nportant distinction bet\veen ""severance 
dan1ages" and "consequential damages," as those terms 
are used herein, which must be constantly borne in mind, 
because, as will be dernonstrated hereafter, the concept of 
'~severance da1nages" is rnuch 1hore liberal than the con-
cept of "'consequential cla1nages." In the case of ~'conse­
(luential darnages," the o\vner, in order to l'P('over, 1nust 
sho\v· that the consequential injury to his lands is peculiar 
to his lands and not of a type suffered hy the puhlie as a 
\Vhole. 4 Nichols, id., §1-1-.1; S(lockdale z·. Denrrr & ltirJ 
Grande vVestern llail1ra.u C1o., :2~ l ,.tah 201, 77 Pac. 8-±9. 
Whereas, in the case of "severance da1nages," the O\\Tner 
is not required to sho\Y the injury to he peculiar to his 
land, on the theory that the ""just cornpensation" guaran-
teed by the constitution refers to the injury or loss to the 
,,·hole tract caused by taking fron1 it that part that is the 
subject of the conde1nnation. -l: N"ichols, id., § 1-1-.:Zl. 
(i) The Award Below for Damages to Respondents' 
Remaining Lands Can Be Properly Sustained as Proper 
"Consequential Damages" As That Term Is Used Herein. 
Bearing in ntind the distinction above noted het\\·een 
·'consequential da1nages" and "severance da1nages," ]t 
\Yill nov,,. be den1onstrated that under our Constitution, 
statutes, and decisions, ""consequential da1nages" 1nay he 
a\\·arded in this State and \\Tere properly a\\,.arded under 
the circumstances of the instant case. 
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It n1ust at the outset be observed that "consequen-
tial damages" may not be R\varded under the rule prevail-
ing in many of the jurisdictions of this country, n1ost 
notable of \Yhich is the Federal rule prohibiting such an 
a\\rard. + Nichols, id., 288 ~ 1-1.1 [1]. This fact n1ust be 
borne in mind in examining many of the authorities cited 
by appellant. The divergence of judicial opinion on this 
subject results directly from the variance in the phrase-
ology of the various constitutional and statutory provi-
sions relating to the subject. 4 Xichols, id., § 14.1 [1]. 
For example, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States provides that: 
'' ... nor shall private property be -taken for 
public use \Yithout just compensation." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
There is no n1ention of "da1nage'' to private property for 
public use in the Fifth A1nend1nent. This explains the 
rule no\\T obtaining in the Federal Courts ; and this is the 
rule that appellant urges like,Yise obtains in the State of 
l.,.tah. l(eeping clearly in Yie\\T appellant's argtnnent that 
dan1ages 1nay not be a\Yarded in the State of l~tah as a 
result of public "-orks perfor1ned upon lands of another, 
let us exa1nine our Constitutional and Statutory provi-
sion~ relating to the subject. 
_A._rtirle I, ~eetion :!:! of the (_ 'ionstitution of the State 
of lTtah i~ identical to that contained in the Federal Con-
stitution except for one Yt>r~- i1nportant distinction. It 
provide~ as follo\YS: 
H Pri Ya te propert~- shall not be taken or dam-
a/;ed for public use "-ithout just con1pensation.'' 
( Eu1phasis supplied.) 
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~eetion 78-34-10(3) lT.C.A., 1953, rnakes the distinction 
even more apparent: 
'~Cornpensation and damages- how assessed 
-The court, jury or referee rnust hear such legal 
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties 
to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain 
and assess: 
* * * 
( 3) If the property, though no part thereof 
is taken, will be damaged by the construction of the 
proposed improvement, the amount of such dam-
ages.'' (Emphasis supplied.) 
The decisions of our Suprerue Court clearly indicate 
that under our Constitution and Statutes, darnages rnay 
be avvarded as a result of activities conducted upon lands 
other than those belonging to the ovvner seeking the 
a\vard. J( inzball v. Salt Lake City, 32 lTtah 253, 90 Pac. 
395; Iienzpstead v. Salt Lake City, 3:2 l~tah 261, 90 Pac. 
397; Cook v. Salt Lake City, -t-8 Utah 58, 157 Pac. 653, 645; 
RolJi:nett v. Price, 7-± Utah 512, 280 Pac. 736; State 1_). 
District Court Fo-urth Judicial District, 94 1}tah 384, 78 
P.2d, 502, 508; Stockdale v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railzray Co., supra; State v. lVard, 112 Utah -±52, 189 P. 
2d 113, 117. 
In discussing the significance of the phraseology con-
tained in Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as 
broadening the scope of damages that rnay be a'varded 
in en1inent domain proceedings in the State of lTtah, the 
Supren1e Court stated in the case of State 1:. Distr1'ct 
Court Fourth Ju-dicial District, supra, as follo\vs: 
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·'~luch arglnnent n1ight be devoted to the que~­
tion "~hether there i~ involved in this case a 'tak-
inO'' or a 'dau1ao·ing·' of 1n·o1)el'tY. ..._:\_hnost count-
a a · . 
less decisions of court~ n1ight be cited on e1th~r 
side of the question. ll' e beliei:e, lunceL·er., ~hat 1n 
incorJJoratiJZg in the cousf'ltutioll a provzszon re-
quiTing just con1pensation for property damaged 
for public use, it 1.ras intended to put an end to 
suclz controversy alld to protect the da1naged prop-
erty ozcucr equally 1.rith the }Jroperfy ozrner 1rhose 
land 1.ras pl1ysically e·utered npon. (En1phasis ~up­
plied.) 
The vie"~ announc-ed iunnediately above is consistent 
'Yith one of the very earlie:-'t pronounce1nents upon thi~ 
:--uhject in this State contained in the case of Stockdale r. 
Denrer & Rio (irande llr estern Rail-1ray Co., . ;;upra, "~here­
in the Supre1ne Court upheld an injunction against de-
fendant rail\Yay eou1pany prohibiting it fron1 the running 
of ear~ and engine~ upon lands adjacent to those of the 
plaintiff, \Yith the provi~o that if the defendant con1pany 
proeeeds in en1inent do1nain, the injunction "~ould be dis-
~olvPd. The ·Court there stated: 
H ~I any of the earlier cases adopted the Ino1-e 
restrictiYP con~trnction, and held that to bring a 
en~<' "~ithin the foregoing prnYi~ion of the Consti-
tn ti on (of the l T n i ted 8 ta te8). there n1ns t be an 
aetna l ph~T~iral appropriation of priYate property 
~ought to lH• ('OllY('rted to a public n8-e: but ... 
the gT(•at- "~eight of the n1ore recent judicial au-
thorit~T. "·l1ieh "~e helieYe to be ~upported by the 
l)<'tter l'('ason, and 'Yhirh i~ 111ore in accord "~th 
our idea~ or eqnit~T and natural .iu~tice, holds that 
an~.~ ~uh~tantial interfere~re \Yith priYate property 
"~ 1ue h dP:-.; troy~ or 1na ten all~T le~sens its Yalt1e, or 
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!Jy tchich the ou·ner's ri,(;ht to its nse and Clljoy-
Jnent ;,,..,. 'in any s11bstautial degree abridged or de-
stroyed is, in fact and in law, a taking in the con-
sti~tu.tion.al sense to the extent of the damages suf-
fered, even though: the title and possession of the 
owner remain u.ndiJstttrrbed. 
* * * 
Under the provisions of the Constitution of 
this State herein before referred to (Article I, 
Section 22), a party ''Those property is about to 
he specially da1uaged in any substantial degree 
for public use has the sa1ne rights and is given 
the sa1ne re1nedies for the protection of his prop-
erty fron1 the threatened injury as \\Tould he ac-
corded hin1 if his property \Vere actually taken and 
appropi"iated for such use. rrhat such is the spirit 
and intent of the foregoing-provision of the Consti-
tution is evident fro1n the tone and character of 
the extended discussions on this question in the 
constitutional convention at the time the provision 
\Yas adopted and becan1e a part of the organic la-\v 
of the State." (E1nphasis supplied.) 
That section of our Code quoted above ( Sertion 78-
34-10 (3), U.C.A. 1953), has long been a part of our 
statutory la\v. See, R. S., 1898, § ·3598. Our Supreme 
Court in the case of Statr l·. TVa rd, sllpra, had occasion to 
briefly 1nake reference to the quoted portion of that 
Statute in the follcnYing \Yords: 
"If there is no taking of part of the propert;.r 
hut onl~r a da1naging as ronte1nplated h~T Para-
graph (3) then ... " 
The question for analysis is not, therefore, as appel-
lant suggests, \vhether or not the damages awarded belo\v 
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were a'varded as a result of the activities conducted b~T 
appellant on lands other than those ·belonging to the re-
spondents, since it is obvious from the foregoing authori-
ties that such dan1ages may be in a 1)roper case recover-
able. Rather the question for analysis is, under 'vhat cir-
cumstances may such da1nages be properly a'Yarded or, 
stated another way, ,vhen are such damages of a type that 
are peculiar or special to the property allegedly da1naged 
and not of a type suffered by the lando,Yner in co1nn1on 
'vith the public as a whole. 
The case of State v. Distr·ict Court Fourth Judicial 
District, supra, clearly indicates, and respondents con-
cede, that not all dan1ages attributable to activity con-
ducted upon adjacent lands are con1pensable. Only· such 
damages as reach the ~'actionable degree~' 1nay be con-
sidered. It was there stated: 
H\Y. e believe that the line of de1narcation 
should be dra,vn at the point of actionable damage. 
The Constitution clearly does not require conlpen-
sation for dan1ages not recognized as actionable, 
at con1n1on la,v, but for a da1nage of property 
'to the actionable degree.' The Constitution Inak-
ers intended the lando,vner to haYe just conlpensa-
tion equall~T 'vi th the lando"~ner "Those property 
,,·a~ ph~Tsicall~T taken.·· 
As to "·hat i~ 1neant bY .. artionable dainag·es·· in the 
. ..__ 
la\\· of 'e1ninent rlon1ain is n1ore prerisel~T illustrated by 
tlH' (\nrlier rn~l) of Tzccnf.IJ-Second Clorporation. etc. c. 
()re,r;on ~C..,rhortline R. (\J .. 3() lTtah :.?~i~. 103 Par. :.?-t-3. ~-+S. 
\Y11PrPin da1nages \Yer(\ sought under our Constitutional 
provi::-;;ion, <luoted ahove, for annoyance and interference 
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\vith the carrying on of orderly undisturbed church 
services. Plaintiff there con1plained of noises, blovving of 
whistles and ringing of bells in connection \vith the opera-
tion of defendant railroad on adjoining land. The Court 
held that damages of this type are not compensable, be-
eause the interference complained of was not one pecu-
liar to the plaintiff, but rather shared by all the residents 
along the railroad track in common with the plaintiff. 
The Court, however, made the following important ob-
servations: 
"It will be observed that in this case no ques-
tion is raised \Vi th respect to interruptions of in-
gress and egress to and front the property alleged 
to be damaged." 
* * * 
'' ... The clause in the Constitution (of Illi-
nois which is identical to that of Utah) is limited 
to damages arising from some physical disturb-
ance or interference with sante property right, as 
distinguished froin mere annoyance. 
* * * 
" . . . In order to bring the case within the 
damage clause of the Constitution there must 
be some physical interference with the property 
itself or with sante easenzent that constihdes nn 
appurtenance thereto." 
* •)(e * 
" . A critical examination of the cases cited 
. will disclose that in nearly all, if not all of 
them, some easement or appurtenance to the prop-
erty in question was physically interfered 1Di,th. 
" (Emphasis supplied.) 
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Let u~ apply the foregoing concepts to the fact~ 
of the instant case. The record sho""\YS \Yithout dispute 
that for 1nany years sheep have been trailed east and 
\Yest aero~s the Little \Talley pit area, \Yhich area has 
afforded the only natural and expedition~ pass for trail-
ing sheep fro1n the ea:'t side of the n1ountain to the \Yest-
t}rn slope. This area \Yas sho\\~n to constitute a natural. 
protective la1nhing ground in addition to and- as an ad-
junct of _the trailing operations. In short, it has been a 
neePssary connecting link bet\Yeen respondents' lands 
situated as they are. It 1nust, \Yithout serious contention, 
be clearly deterurined to be a valuable appurtenance to 
respondents' re1naining grazing lands. This appurtenanee 
ha~ not only heen physically entered upon, but has been 
physically cut a\\·ay leaYing in its stead a ya\Yning, Inan-
lllade hole, da1naging respondents to a substantial degree 
in their use and enjoyn1ent of their re1naining lands be-
e a use of the nature of the use to \Yhich those lands had 
heen, in fa(·t, put. It is at once clear that such a substan-
tial interferenc-e doe~ not constitute that type that ad-
joining lando\Y'ners ( as~tnning such lando\Yners to haYe 
existPd) having no peculiar interest in the use of the 
ljittle \ .. alley- area, \Yould haYe shared in connnon \Yith 
I'Pspondents. On the contrary. as a result of the use to 
"·hieh respondPnts put their lands, and as a further result 
of thp Yital and integral part that the Little \~alley area 
pla~~e<i in ('Ol~nertion \Yith that nse. such danu1ges. it i~ 
snlnnitte<i, 111nst, of lH'<:Pssit~·, be of n t~·pe ~pecial and 
lH'culiar to I'Pspondent~ · 118<.:' of their lands and not of a 
kino shared in ronnnon \Yith the public generally. 
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lt folio\\·~, therefore, that appellant's argtunent to the 
pffect that the a\Yard appealed frorn cannot be sustained 
because based in part upon appellant's operations on 
lands of another, n1ust of necessity fail, \Yhen, as demon-
~trated above, such an award \vould have been proper 
though based entirely upon such operations on lands of 
another. 
(ii) 'The Award Below for Damages to Respondents' 
Remaining Lands Can Be S,ustained as Proper "Sever-
ance Damages" As That Term Is Used Herein. 
If \Ye uta~' ass tune, for purposes of a rgtunent only, 
that the dau1ages sustained hy l'Pspondents to their rP-
Inaining lands by reason of the dPstruetion of the trail-
ing easen1ent arross the Little\; alley pit area, \Yere not of 
a type peculiar or special to such re1naining lands hut 
\\~ere of a type shared \vith the general public in connnon, 
nevertheless, it \\~ill no\\~ be dernonstrated that the a\\~ard 
belo\Y, though based upon the operations of appellant up-
on the \Yhole pit area and not just upon that portion of the 
pit area belonging to the respondents, is properly sus-
tainable as ••severance da1nages" as that tern1 has heen 
used herein. It should he re1nen1bered, as pointed out 
earlier in this brief, that •·severance dan1ages" ernbraee 
a rnore liberal concept than ··consequential da1nages'' in 
that ""severance da1nages" 1nay he a\varded, though such 
darnages are of a type that are not peculiar to the land-
ov\"ner but shared in connnon \Yith the general puhlic. 
··severance darnages," unlike "'consequential daHl-
ages,,, as those terrns have been defined herein, are prop-
erly a\\ ... arded in all the jurisdictions of this country in-
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eluding that of the Federal Government, because, as 
pointed ·out above, land has actually been taken from a 
landowner. See Section 78-34-10 (2), UCA, 1953. It 
appears, ho"rever, to be the general rule that ordinarily 
the depreciatio;n in value of the remaining lands is limited 
to only such as is attributable to the use of the land taken 
from the owner of the remainder area. There appears, 
ho,vever, in reason and justice, to have developed a clear-
cut exception to this general rule. That exception may be 
stated as follo,vs: That \Yhere the damages caused to an 
owner's re1naining area by reason of the severance there-
fron1 of part of such tract are inseparable fron1 the dan1-
ages caused to the remainder area by the use of lands ac-
quired from others, then the O\vner is entitled to his full 
damage, though it be based in part upon the use of his 
lands theretofore severed and the use of other lands. ± 
Nichols, id., 315, §1-!-.21 [1], in speaking of the general 
rule states as follo"~s: 
"This rule has been criticized upon the ground 
that it is difficult, if not in1possible~ to separate 
one ele1nent fro1n the other~ and that under the 
eiretunstances the O\Yner of the re1nainder area is 
entitled to all dan1age caused by the use of an 
entire project. _A. railroad. for instance. is an en-
tire thing. It is in1possible for any hu1nan intelli-
genep to separate the loss or injur~~ \Yhich its oper-
ation causes. apportioning so n1uch to one portion 
and so 1nueh to another.·· 
One of thP earlier casf•s to announce this exception 
IS thP ease of Cllica,(/O [(_ l\:.. ;._\7 llailzraJJ COJNj)(lJilf r. r·an 
(? e·vc. G~ J(n 11. 6GG. 33 Pae. +I~. "Therein the <railroad 
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contended that the landovvner should recover da1nage~ 
only for the injuries sustained by him because of the us,~ 
of the railroad of that part of its proposed right of \Yay 
that \vas actually taken fro1n his land, and that nothing 
could be recovered because of cuts and embankments or of 
the construction and operation of the road on property 
belonging to others. The Court, in disposing of this con-
tention, stated as follows: 
"The right to condemn the land is based upon 
the necessity existing or at least supposed to exist 
that the company should have it for use in con-
nection vvith its road. We think the cuts, embank-
ments tracks, ditches and right of way are to be 
considered as one en tire thing in determining the 
plaintiff's damages. Usually the appropriation of 
a narrovv strip along one of the boundary lines of 
a tract of land results in comparatively little daHl-
age to the land not taken, but it is not al\\Tays so, 
and vvhere any portion of the plaintiff's land is 
condernned, we are unable to conceive any rule 
by \\rhich the plaintiff's damages could or should 
be measured at either 1nore or less than the whole 
damage -vvhich he actually sustains by reason of the 
appropriation of his land, and the construction of 
the road." (Emphasis supplied.) 
.A_nd again in the case of Blesch v. Railu'ay Cornpany, -1:3 
\Vis. 183, 2 N.vV. 113, it \vas stated as follo,vs: 
"The counsel for the con1pany argued that 
the plaintiff should recover such damages only as 
resulted fro1n the six-inch roadbed encroachment 
upon his pre1nises ... If by this it is meant that 
the plaintiff should recover only the fractional 
part of the damages which the construction and 
operation of the road worked to his premises, a 
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bare stateinent of the proposition is ~ufficient. to 
sho\\" its unsoundness. A railroad 1s an entire 
thing, and it is ilnvossible for any hun1~n ~ntelli­
gence to separate the lo~s or injury \Ylnch It:-; op-
eration cause:-;, apportioning so Inuch to one por-
tion and so Inuch to another." 
In the case of Ila[J!J((rd r. 1'he .._{lgolla School District~ 
113 lo\\~a -±86, 85 X.\\'. 777, ",.herein a half lot \Yas severed 
fron1 plaintiff'·:-; property for u~e together \\"ith other 
property in the construction of a scho-ol site, it \\"as ~tated: 
""\Vl1o can say in this case, for instance, ho'v 
u1uch the inconvenience due to the proxilnity of 
the school building on the balance of this block 
"~ould be increased by the fact that the half lot in 
(1uestion ,,,.as included in the schoolhouse site~ 
. . . if the legislature has provided that a n1ore 
liberal Inea~ure of ro1npensation shall be adopted 
-one "Thieh give~ to the 1nan "~ho~e property is 
taken eo1npen~ation for dainages '"·hieh he actuall)~ 
~uffer~, although one \Yho~e land is not taken n1ust 
~uffpr the ~a111e injury \Yithout eoinpensation-
then the eorporation ",.hieh seeks to take the land 
un1~t ~uh1ni t. ... ,,~ e see no reason, therefore, ",.h)T 
the ineonYenienre due to the proxi1nity of the 
~rhoolhou~P. a~ affecting the 1narket Yalue of ap-
pellee'~ residence property, should not haYe been 
taken into account.·· 
In thP ra~<' of --:lodrcu·.-.,· r. ( 1o.r. 1:.?~1 Conn. 415. ~9 .... \. 
~d G87, a ~1nall triangular portion nf the plaintiff"s prop-
ert~,. \\,.a~ taken for n~P in the construction of a raised 
hig]n,,.n~ ... thP <'lllhanlnnent for "Thich ~tarted on the land 
taken. rrhe ( ionrt ~tated a~ follo\\T~: 
~~rt "Tould he YPr~T difficult to separate the 
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effeet upon the value of the plaintiff's re1naining 
land of so n1uch of the e1nbanku1ent as \vas on the 
land taken fron1 the effect upon that value of the 
e1nbankrnent as a \Vhole. :~ * * The ele1nent of cause 
and effect is present in any a"Tard for depreciation 
in the value of the re1naining land due to the use 
of the land taken for the 1naking of the iinprove-
rnent; dan1ages of that kind are given because they 
are eaused by the use of the land taken; and ",.here 
the making of the i1nprovement requires as an in-
tegral and inseparable part the use of the land 
taken, though th-e improvement-as a whole extends 
to adjoining land, that us~ is a contributing cause 
of the effect produced by the entire i1nprove1nent 
* * * Where the use of the land taken constitutes 
an integral and inseparable part of the single use 
to "'"hich the land taken and other adjoining land 
is put, the effect of the \vhole i1nprovement is 
properly to be considered in estirnating the de-
preciation in value of the ren1aining land." 
Recently the Supre1ne Court of the State of l\Iinne-
sota adopted the exception announced above and modi-
fied the la"T of that State as theretofore announced in 
the case of ""-4da;ns r. Ch.icago B. & ~r. R. Co.) 39 ~linn. 
286, 39 N.,v-. 629, ",.hen in the ease of C1ity of C1roolo-don 
c. Erickson, 69 X.\V. 2d 909, 91-± (~Iinn.1955), it held that 
a landovYner 1nay be entitled to recover da1nages for the 
depreciation of his re1naining land caused h~,. the erection 
of a se,yage disposal plant in part upon lands ~Pvered 
fron1 the 0\\7 ner's tract and in part upon lands helonging 
to others. The court stated in the Erickson case: 
'''Ve therefore n1odify the rule of the _..\clains 
case to the extent that ,,,.here a part of an o\vner's 
land is taken for a public irnprove1nent :-:uch as 
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this, and the part taken constitutes an ir~.tegral 
and inseparable part of a single use to. 'vh1ch the 
land taken and other adjoining land lS put, the 
owner is entitled to recover the full damage to 
his remaining property due to such publi? ~m­
provement even though portions of the publ1c lill-
provement are located on land taken from sur-
rounding owners." 
In the case of Campbell ~-. ['nited State.i, 266 l~.s. 
368, 69 L.Ed. 328 (1924), -,vhich case is cited in appellant's 
brief, the district court had found separately the danl-
ages sustained by the owner to his re1naining lands as the 
result of the use to \vhich the land taken fron1 hin1 harl 
been put and separately the an1ount of damages sustained 
as a result of the \Yhole i1nprovement. The Supreme 
(~ourt held that the lando,vner \vas entitled only to the 
for1ner amount, and in so doing, n1ade reference to the 
Blesch, T""an Cle~·e, and Haggard cases, cited above. The 
court noted, ho\vever, as follo·w .. s : 
"In each of these cases, it \Yas in1possible sepa-
rately to ascertain the da1nages caused to the re-
Inainder of the o\vner·s tract by the taking and 
proposed use of a part of it. In this case such 
daJJlO{!CS 1rere separatel,lt found. alld plaiHtiff 
doe.-..' not con1plain in re8pect of tlze anzount of 
tlzat c!c;nenf.'' (En1phasis supplied.) 
In light of the exception announced to the general 
rul<) by the foregoing authorities. it is proper that \Ye 
exc.unine the lTtah Statute dealing specifieally \Yith ··seYer-
ancP dau1ages." Section 78-34-10 ( 2). lT. C.~\ .. 1953 pro-
YidPs that there n1n~t be assessed: 
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·~ ( ~) If the property sought to be conde1nned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel the dam-
ages which vvill accrue to the portion not sought 
to be conden1ned by reason of its severance from 
the portion sought to be condemned and the con-
struction of the i1nprovement in the manner pro-
posed by the plaintiff." (Emphasis supplied.) 
It is significant, vve sub1nit, that our Statute does 
not limit a landowner solely to the da1nages to his re-
rnaining lands resulting fro1n the severance alone. It 
states clearly that such damages shall be a\\Tarded as may 
be sustained by reason of ( 1) "its severance fron1 the 
portion sought to be condemned,'' and ( 2) "the construc-
tion of the improven1ent in the manner proposed by the 
plaintiff." Viewed in the light least favorable to the 
respondents, it is submitted that the legislators by en-
acting such a statute have clearly ingrained into the la'v 
of this State the exception to the general rule above 
announced. \Tie,ving the Statute in the light most favor-
able to the respondents, it rnay be suggested that dam-
ages may be thereunder awarded to the ren1aining lands 
as a result of the entire project \vithout regard to "Thether 
that part thereof \Yhich is conducted upon lands severed 
is an integral and inseparable part of the \vhole. 
Be that as it 1nay, ho\vever, it is subrnitted that the 
facts in the record, in any event, clearly fall \vithin the 
exception to the general rule above noted. The pit exca-
vated by appellant represents one entire project. It seen1s 
an obvious fact that respondents' lands taken constituted 
an inseparable part of the whole pit. Who can say, \vith 
any degree of reason, hovv rnuch of the damage to re-
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~pondents' ren1a1n1ng lands \\·as eansed by the renloYal 
of the 1nillions of c·ubic yard~ of gravel fron1 their lands 
alone and ho\\· 1nuch of that da1nage \Yas caused by there-
Inoval of the 1nillions of cubic yard~~ of gravel fron1 other 
lands, apportioning so 1nuch to one and so 1nuch to an-
other. It is sul11nitted that it is clear fron1 the record that 
it \Yould he absolutely in1possible '"for any hlnnan intelli-
gence" to accurately deter1nine ho\Y 1nuch of the dilninu-
tion of respondent~' re1naining land~ \Yas attributable 
solel~~ to the excavation done on their lands. It is sub-
nlitted that such dan1ages cannot he separated and that 
re~pondents' lands taken forn1ed an inseparable and in-
tegral part of the entire pit. 
It is, therefore subn1itted that the da1nage to respond-
ents' re1naining lands 1nay be properly a\\~arded fron1 the 
ex<·avation of the entire pit area, although part of that 
a rea be upon lands belonging to others upon either the 
theor~~ of Hconsequential dan1ages. ·· as that tern1 is used 
herein, and/ or under the 1nore liberal concept of ··sever-
anee da1nage~. '' a~ that tern1 is used in this brief. 
(c) THE DAMAGES AWARDED BELOW TO RESPOND-
ENTS' RElVIAINING LANDS WERE FOR THE DEPRE-
CIATION IN 'THE VALUE OF THOSE LANDS AND 
NOT L 0 S S E S TO THE BUSINESS ·CONDUCTED 
THEREON. 
rrbi~ (iourt I~ urged h~- appellant to OYt?l"-tUI'll the 
jnrlg-Hlent helo"· for the rea~on that the ~o-called sever-
n 11('( I da lll ag·p~ a \\•n nierl he 1 owr ,,·ere, in eff ert' danlagt'~ 
rP~ulting to the ~heep operation~ of the respondent~ 
and tl1~1t, therpf'ore. the saiHE\ heing a da1nag~ to the 
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business of re~pondent~, is not properly recoverable in 
e1ninent dontain proceedings, if at all. Appellant relies 
in Inaking this contention upon certain testin1ony adduced 
fro1n respondent Chournos and quoted on Page 35 of 
appellant's brief. Although respondents do not quarrel 
"rith the lavv as announced by the decisions cited by 
appellant, it is sub1nitted that appellant has Inisinter-
preted and 1nisconstrued the purpose and the nature of 
the testilnon~~ offered and has 1nisapplied the la\\? to 
the facts of this case. 
The testirnony clearly sho\vs that the 1neasure of 
dantages clairned for the re1naining lands of the re-
spondents and testified to by the respondent Chournos 
and \Yitness Keller \vas the rli1ninHti·on in the nzarkct 
value of the land as a result of the proposed improve-
JneJlt, to "Tit: the excavation (Tr. 171, 183-185, 232). 
The 1neasure of darnages utilized \vas not, as one n1ight 
suspect fron1 reading appellant's brief and the abstracts 
of the decisions contained therein, loss of profits, de-
~truction of livestock, or loss of good \vill. 
It \vas both proper and necessary for respondents 
to sho\\T belo\v the use to \vhich respondents' re1naining 
lands \vere plainly adapted and the use to \vhich such 
lands had, in fact, been put, and to further sho\v that 
the Little , ... alley area in \vhich the huge excavation 
pit -\,Tas dug by appellant for1ned an integral part of 
that use. It "Tas the use of respondents' re1naining lands 
and the use to \vhich those lands \Yere plainly adapte(l 
that gave then1 value. The use to \Yhich the land is 
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adapted and has been put is always a relevant inquiry 
insofar as it affects the market value of the land. 
4 Nichols, id., 38, §12.2 [3], et seq. states as follo\vs: 
"Generally speaking, the true r~le seems to 
be to permit proof of all the var1ed elements 
of value; that is, all the facts which the O\Vner 
\vould properly and naturally press upon the at-
tention of a buyer \vith \vhom he is negotiating 
a sale and all the facts \Yhich would naturally 
influence a person of ordinary prudence desiring 
the purchase. In this estimation, the owner is 
entitled to have consideration given to all the 
capabilites of the property, to the business or 
use, if any, to u·hich it has been de1.-:oted, and 
to any and every use to \Yhich it 1nay reasonably 
be adapted or applied. And this rule includes 
the adaptation of value of the property for any 
legiti1nate purpose or business, even though it 
has never been so used and even though the 
O\\~ner has no present intention to devote it to 
such use.'' ( En1phasis supplied.) 
And at 263, §13.3 [1] : 
'"\\~here the character of the property is such, 
ho\\·('ver, that independently of the labor, skill 
or kno\v1edge of its O\Ynei\ it lends itself peeu-
liarl~r to a particular nse. a busiJless based upOJ 1 
such u,-..·c. and then the profits therefron1 1nay be 
considered in a~certaining· the 1narket Yalue of the 
land. Al~o. "~here such b~siness contributes all or 
thP principal part of the value of the land, it has 
h(\en held that consideration Ina~· be g1ven to sneh 
businPs8. '' (l~~u1pha8is supplied.) 
1\fol'('OVt\r, <'Prtain portions of respondents' re1nain-
1np; lanrls. partienlral~· those of respondent ('1hournos, 
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were disconnected fro1n the parcel actually taken ( Tr. 
1-l--l--147). The la\v appears to be rather clear that where 
severance darnage is clailned for remaining lands that 
are parcels separated fro1n the parcel condemned and 
severed, that severance darnages may not ordinarily 
be a \Yarded unless it be shown that the several parcels 
constituted one economic unit. 4 Nichols, id., 426, 428, 
§14.3, discusses this proposition as follows : 
"It is Vt7ell settled that \Vhen the whole or a 
part of a particular tract of land is taken for 
the public use, the owner of such land is not 
entitled to compensation for injury to other sep-
arate and independent parcels belonging to him 
which results from the taking. 
* * * 
"If, as a matter of fact, however, the con-
tiguous parcels constitute one tract, so far as 
actual use by the o"\vner is concerned, it has been 
held that the contiguous parcel may be considered 
as a remainder area and the damages ascertained 
upon that basis. Thus, if several parcels together 
constitute one farm, operated as a unit, the 
dan1ages must be considered to the entire farm." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The question then arises as to "Then are t\vo tracts 
of land contiguous as that term is used in the quota-
tion above. 4 Nichols, id., 432, et seq., §14.31 [1] ans,vers 
this question as follows: 
"Actual contiguity between tVtro separate 
parcels is ordinarily essential to merit considera-
tion as a unified tract. Actual physical separa-
tion by an intervening space bet\veen two parcels 
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belonging to the san1e O\\Tner is ordinarily ground 
for holding that the parcels are. t~ be treated 
as independent of each other, but 1t IS _not neces-
sarilv a conclusive test. If th f land 1s c~rct1J}ally 
occu JJied or in 1tse, the u niJty of the use i~ the 
ch£ef cri'terioru. \"Vhen t\YO parcels are physically 
distinct, there 1nust be such a connection or re-
lation of adaptation, convenience and actual and 
per1nanent use as to 1nake tlze enjoyn1.ent of one 
reasonably necessary to the eujoynlent of the 
other ill the nzost advantageous 1nanner in the 
business for 1chich it i:; ·used, to constitute a 
sing! e J)(l reel 1rit hi n the nz ea n i-ng of the rule.'' 
( E1nphasis supplied.) 
1_,he C~ourt'~ attention i~ directed to the case of 
(;raud Rirer Danz ..._4uthority c. Thonzpsou, llS F.2d, 
2-l-:2 (lOth (~ir. 19-!1), "Therein the question 1ras raised 
a~ to \vhether or not it \Yas a question for the Court 
or for the jury to deter1nine \Yhether t\vo certain tracts 
of land constituted one unit or separate independent 
tract~. The Court in its treat1nent of this question, 
di~en~~ed the ~o-called unit rule (expressed in the quo-
tation ahoYe) at son1e length and \Yith exhaustiYe ci-
tation, indicating celarly that it is oYer"Thehningly the 
general rule of thi~ country. It i~ apparent that the 
application of the unit rule in deter1nining seYerance 
dainagP~. hy it~ 'TPr~~ definition, '"·ould he all but in1-
po~~ihle ,,·ithont a ennsideration of the use to w·hich 
tlH• land it~Plf i~ put and thi~ i8 true ·w·hether the n~e 
to "·hiell tlH• land he put be that of a farn1 operation, 
as i~ the u~ual ea~P, or a liYe8tock operation as in the 
in~h:tnt <·a~P. Cl'. Proro Rircr 1rater rrsers ~-t-.:soci(lfion 
r. ('a rl.-.:on, 10;1 fTtah 9~1, 133 P.:.?d 777. It is ~ulnnitted 
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that unity of use being the criterion, no reasonable 
logical distinction Inay be n1ade on the basis of the 
nature of the particular use to \vhich the land is put. 
This is illustrated clearly in the case of City of 11ulsa 
v. Horwitz) 131 Okla. 63, 267 P~ 85:2, 854, wherein the 
doctrine \\·as applied by reason ·of the use of tw·o parcels 
in a unified p1pe supply business, \vherein the court 
stated: 
HThe evidence sho,,·~ that the tvvo lots were 
separated h)· a :20-foot alley but that the)? \vere 
suitable for and intended to be and had been 
used in the pipe supply business, \Vere bought 
:• at the san1e ti1ne and intended to be used for 
that purpose, and had al\vays been used together, 
so that the taking of a part of Lot 1 necessarily 
affected the value of Lot :2 to son1e extent." 
i\ very recent pronounceutent b)r our Supre1ne (_ iourt 
in the case of vVebet~ ]]a.-.,· in Water ( 10Ju.,·erca JlC.IJ Dis! rict 
v. Ward) et a!) 3-!7 P .2d 862, SG-! ( li tab, 1959) clearly 
indicates that f'"tah is a1nong those jurisdictions eonl-
Initted to the unit rule and that further in its applica-
tion, the nature and extent of the business conductefl 
upon the land is a vital and necessary consideration for 
the court and jury. In that case, the respondents oper-
ated a dairy farn1 and claiu1ed and "rere a\vardecl suh-
stantial darnages as a result of the severance of the 
land conde1nned. The court held that it \\"as error for 
the trial court to prohibit exa1nination as to the profit-
able operation of respondents' dairy, the lnu·; in fss con-
ducted upon the land in question, and in so doing, ~tated 
as follo,vs: 
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"The objections of the defense couns~l a~d 
the rulings of the court prevented effe_ct1ve In-
quiry into the important and materval fa·ct: 
Whether the dairy farm was in fact a well-bal-
anced economic unit as the defendant claimed." 
( E1nphasis supplied.) 
It is submitted, therefore, that appellant has failed 
to dra\Y the necessary distinction bet\\Teen measure of 
dainages, on the one hand, and use, adaptability to use, 
and unity of use of the lands involved by reference to 
the business conducted thereon, on the other. The evi-
dence clearly sho\Yed that the proper measure of danl-
ages \\'"as the diminution in the value of the laiid and 
the court's instruction to the jury clearly encompassed 
this n1easure ( Tr. 350, 351). There can be, therefore, no 
error based upon the presentation of the e-vidence at-
tacked by appellant, for suc.h evidence under the cir-
cumstances of this case, \Yith regard to the issue of 
severance damages~ \Yas not only proper but necessary. 
(d) THE DAMAGES AWARDED TO RESPONDENTS' 
REMAINING LANDS WERE NOT THE RESULiT OF 
ADDING VALUES FOR THE DIFFERENT USES OF 
THE LANDS TAKEN. 
Appellant as an additional reason for reYersal, 
contends that the a"Tard belo\Y \Yas arrived at by adding 
t hP value~ of the different u~es for the land taken. 
A fair appraisal of the argn1nent presented by appellant 
in thi~ eonnPetion indicntt·~ that appellant contends that 
l'P~pondents Ina~· not reeoYer for the Ya1ue of the sand 
and gTaYel taken and also, in addition thereto, the 
Yalne of the ~trip of respondents' respec.tiYe lands upon 
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\vhich the pit \vas excavated and fro1n \vhich the gravel 
deposit \\·as extracted. It is submitted that this argu-
lltent also 1nisconceives the nature of the evidence and 
the a\vard below. The award below \vas, of course, in 
t\vo parts. The first vvas for the value of the sand and 
gravel taken on a unit basis at a fixed price per unit, 
\vhich the jury determined to be three cents per cubic 
yard of gravel. A determination on that basis \vas 
necessary because appellant did not seek to take the 
land itself but rather sought a right of way upon the 
land for the purpose of excavating therefrom the gravel 
and fill n1aterial. As pointed out earlier in this brief, 
there \\Tas thus presented for the trial court below an 
exeeption to the general rule that the profits, price, or 
value of minerals, taken separately, may not be con-
sidered in determining the value of the land condemned. 
Cf. State of Utah v. Noble, sttpra. 
In addition to the value of the gravel deposit taken 
by appellant the respondents also claimed severance 
and/or consequential damages to their remaining lands. 
Appellant apparently fails to take cognizance of the 
fact that these damages are based upon the din1inution 
in the value of the remainjng lands of respondents by 
reason of the severance of a portion thereof by appellant 
and as a result of the construction of the improven1ent 
here involved, to \vit: The excavation of the pit area 
fron1 ''Thich the sand and gravel \vere extracted. This 
a1nount is not, as appellant claims, additional conlpen-
sation for the lands taken, but is clearly an award for 
the damages sustained to the remaining lands belonging 
to respondents. 
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· l{espondents again do not quarrel \Yith the la\Y a:' 
announced bv the authorities cited in appellant's brief. 
:Ho,vever, th.e respondents invite the eourt's attention 
to the fact that each citation dea1s \Yith the proposition 
of double coutpensation for the land actually taken and 
do not deal at all \Yith the question of severance and/or 
consequential da1nages to rentaining lands. The lR\Y a~ 
announced hy these various authoritie~ have no applica-
tion \Yhatsc)t-Yer to the question of severance or ron-
sequential da1nages to other lands and a fortiori no 
application to the i~sues sought to be raised in this 
appeal. 
It is possible, of coursE\ that an a\Yard of double 
da1nages n1ight conceivably result in a particular type 
of ca~e. ~-,or exau1ple, in the instant case. had appellant 
seen fit to eonde1nn the lands belonging to respondent~ 
in the Little \"""alley area, rather than the fill material 
c-ontained therein, and the Court below'" had a\varded 
an enhanced Yalue of these lands by reason of such 
lands for1ning an integral part of all of respondents' 
lands. rather than an a\Yard of its actual value con-
sidered separate and apart fron1 respondents' land~. 
and then. in addition. also a\\·arded seYerance da1nages 
to the rentaining lands. there n1ight conceivably be a rase 
Inadp out for double da1nages. 'rn further illustrate, 
if thP respondents' lands had been actually eonden1ned 
and \\Tithout considering all of the land~ O\Yned by re-
spondents of \\Thieh the lands taken foru1ed a part. tlw 
lands taken \\Tere of a Ya lnt• of $~0.00 per acre. but that 
su<'h Ynlne \Yas Pnh:lnced, h~· rea~on of it con~titutin~ 
70 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on integral part of these other lands, to $30.00 an aere, 
and then 8everance danutges \Yere a\\?arded in addition 
to the enhanced value, double da1nages \vould probably 
result. See ± Nichols, id., 331 ~14.23 [1]. 
1-Iowever, as pointed out above, this was 1nost defi-
nitely not the case below. The value of the rock and 
fill 1naterial \vas separately evaluated, and under no 
posture of the evidence. adduced belo\v could it conceiv-
ably he said that that value \Yas fixed in consideration 
of the use of such rock and fill 1naterial in eonnPetion 
\vith the balance of the lands o\vned h)? the respondents. 
~\_ppellant cites the case of .J/orlon IJutler 7'iJJtl)er C1o. 
v. l "niHed States, 91 :F,. ~d 88-1-, in his arglunent upon 
this point, "~herein the O\\'"ner atten1pted to recover not 
only for the value of the ti1nber taken frou1 his land, 
but also for the stun1page value of the tin1ber. It is 
subrnitted that a 1nore avpropriate and applieable ex-
anlple \vould he one "?herein the lando,v-ner o\vned !l 
hon1e site surrounded hy forest land and "?here the 
conden1ning authority conden1ned a right of \\'"a~r onl~,. 
upon the forest land to denude it and take a\\'"ay the 
ti1nber gro,v-ing thereon. ·Could it then he said, hy any 
stretch of the i1nagination, that pa~,.rnent by the con-
deinning authority for the resulting cli1ninution in value 
of the O"\\ ... ner's ho1ne site by reason of the loss of shade, 
cover, protection, and general beauty previously afforded 
to the hon1e site area by the forest need not be 1na(le 
since the lando\vner has already been cornpensated for 
that loss ""'hen he received payn1ent for the tirnher at 
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its fair market value per board foot~ One need not 
be a real estate expert to realize that the value of 
the home site has been greatly diminished by the taking 
of the trees. On the contrary, there is a clear and distinct 
damage resulting to the owner's remaining land that 
should be _properly paid in addition to the value of 
the timber taken. So it is in the instant case. 
It is submitted, therefore, that appellant's argument 
seeks by son1e verbal legerden1ain to t\vist the situation 
as reflected in the record into something \Yhich is clearly 
not justified by the evidence. 
(e) THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF RECORD 
UPON WHICH THE JURY PROPERLY BASED THEIR 
FINDING OF DAMAGES 'TO RESPONDENTS' REMAIN-
ING LANDS. 
The record clearly reflects that the respondent 
Chournos and the \Yitness Boyd I~eller, \vho together 
represented a co1nbined total of at least si..~ty years' 
experience in the sheep and liYestock business conducted 
upon the Yer~T area in question ( Tr. 15-t 221). testified 
that, in their respectiYe opinions, the diininution in the 
value of respondents' re1naining lands as a result of 
tlH• excavation of the pit by appellant \Yas at least a 
~0 ft' depreciation, in the opinion of Chournos, and a 
~;>~~ deprc~rintion, in the opinion of l(eller ( Tr. 171, 
lS:~-1 S5, ~3~). rPhe record further reflects that the rental 
l'Pe<'ived fron1 the Hnnter-_.A_rthur lands \ras $7,000.00 
annually ( Tr. 170). \\'"ithout an~- consideration being 
gi V(\11 the 90,000 HCl'PS of the (~hournos lands \\-hich are 
loeated else\\·her(\' tlH\ record and exhibits sh0 ,,- that the 
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l)ro1nontory ~lountain lands of respondent Chournos are 
identical to those of respondents I-I unter and Arthur 
in quality, location and use, and that as a matter of 
fact, Chournos, Hunter and Arthur own undivided in-
terests in several of the same parcels, \vhich fact required 
the establishu1ent of herd lines (Tr. 199, 200). It was 
clearly presented to the jury that a 20-year capitali-
zation of the annual return on a tract of leased land 
is proper and acceptable to arrive at the value thereof 
(Tr. 232). It is submitted, therefore, that although no 
specific 1narket values of respondents' remaining lands 
\\Tere given, either before or after the excavation of the 
pit area, under the testimony given, such values \vould 
be simply the result of a mathematical computation 
involving the multiplication of the rental value times 
:20 to arrive at the market value before the excavation 
of the pit and, using the opinion given by \vitness Keller 
as to the amount of depreciation, simply depreciating 
that value 25% to arrive at the value after the excava-
tion of the pit- the difference representing the dan1ages 
clai1ned. Appellant apparently novv seeks a nevv trial 
on the basis that the Inathematical computation above 
referred to vvas performed and only the end results 
thereof, namely, the amount of dan1ages, rather than 
the '"before" and "after" values of the land, given to 
the jury. 
5 Nichols id., 346, §23.3, 1n discussing this very 
issue states as follows: 
"Once it is conceded that the \vitness may 
state the before and after values it is a 1nere 
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1natter ·of forn1 ,v·hether the si1nple Inatheinatical 
co1nputation of arriving at the da1nage hy sub-
tracting the value after fron1 the value before 
the taking i:-; to be 1nade h~~ the \Yitness or hy 
the jury. It i:-; accordingly held in 1nany juri~­
dictions that a duly qualified expert may testify 
directly as to the a1nount of the da1nage * * *. 
In ~<nne of the state~ in \Yhiclr ~uch testi1nony i~ 
not considered ~trictly co1npetent, its ad1nission 
is not necessarily a cause for setting aside a 
YE~rdict other\\~i~e unobjectionable. The n1oderll 
teudency is to discard arbitrary rules of erideHce 
1rhich hare no substantial principle behind them, 
lJut 1rlziclt continually int~ol1·e the court and coun-
.~·el in quibbles o0er the fornz in u·hich inter'roga-
tories shall be put. It has been said that opinion 
fridence nzay be allozred o.f the din1inutio·n in 
1·alu e u;itho ut a state nze nt o.f the before and after 
·calues." (En1phasis supplied.) 
'"The fact that the co1nputations of the Yalues of 
the re1naining property "before" and ·•after" utilize the 
capitalization of the rental return of the property in-
volved doc~ not render such testin1ony incon1petent. 
'''"hen appellant refer~ to the use of rental Yalue as 
Hartificial'' and ··deeeptiYE\ ~~ it is oYerlooking a rather 
ha~ie and roininon-sense device in the fixing of land 
Yaluation~ .. A~ ~tated in 3 Xichols id.~ 213, §19.:2: 
··Ho\Yever~ a~ a ~afe \Yorking rule, i.f property 
is rentrd for the usc to 1rhich it is best adapted, 
the actual rent re< .... ·crred, capitalh:ed at the rate 
1rhich local custon1 adopts for the purpose . .fo·nns 
one of the best tests of ralue. and arcordinO'lr 
. ~ b • 
Pvid<\nep of the rent actually rereiYed at a ti1ne 
rea~onahly near the p1u1rt 1un tr> n1 paris of the 
taking ~hould he ad1nitted." (En1phasi~ supplied.) 
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T'ltis has long been thP la\\"' of this jurisdiction. In 
the ease of ().rJrlen L. & I. Ry. Co. c. Jones, 51 lTtah G~, 
168 J>ac. 548, 550, the railroad co1npany alleged error 
upon the part of the lower court in allo,,·ing the land-
owner's counsel to elicit on eross-exa1nination the rent 
paid for the land in question in the year 1914. The 
crucial date for the fixing of value \Ya~ ... \ ugust 6, 
1915. [It should be noted that the rental value testified 
to in the instant case \Yas fixed on the prPeise date of 
the oceupancy of these lands by appellant (Tr. 170.] 
It \Yas f-;tated hy our Supren1e Court as follo\\·s: 
''The general holding of the courts is to the 
effect ho\vever that for the purpose of proving 
value of the pre1nises in question it is proper 
to sho\v the rental value of the pre1nises and 
\Yhat rents \Yere paid therefor at and for a reas-
onable ti1ne before the action \vas connnenced." 
There \vas placed before the jury helo\\· eoutpetent 
and uncontradicted evidence of: 1. the rental value of 
the lands involved; 2. the aceeptable rate that local 
custon1 has adopted for the capitalization of rental value 
to arrive at 1narket value; and 3. the percentage of 
dintinution in that value as a result of the i1nprove1nent. 
There "·as also placed before the jury the proper rneas-
ure of da1nages ~tated in the court's instructions ( Tr. 
350, 351). Frorn this, the jury could and did properly-
dra\\"' its conclusion as to the an1ount of dantage su:--:-
tained . .:\ppellant hy seeking a ne\v trial, and the addi-
tional expensive and prolonged litigation that a ne\\"' 
trial entails, in order to establish the "'before" and 
.. after'' values of the land involved \vhen these values 
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are n1erely mathematical conclusions easily drawn froin 
the factual testimony in the record,·. s-eeks, it is sub-
mitted, to sarcifice the ends of fair and practicable justice 
for the sake of a mere formal technicality. 
POINT III. 
BASED ON THE COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF RECORD, 
IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE VERDICT BELOW WAS 
EXCESSIVE AND THE RESUUT OF PASSION AND PREJU-
DI·CE. 
Respondents \vill not burden the court \Yith a pro-
longed recital of the competent evidence presented below 
respecting valuation and damage. That evidence has 
been detailed at some length earlier in this brief. 
Suffice it to say that the testimony given, b~~ \vay 
of direct opinion, co1nparable sales, .and analysis of the 
nature and adaptibility of the property here involved, 
by seven \Yell-qualified, experienced \vitnesses clearly 
suports a verdict fixing valuation at 3c per cubic yard 
for the 1naterial taken. The over\vheln1ing strength of 
this testi1nony is 1nore apparent when Yie'' in the light 
of appellant's testin1on~~ ·offered to contradict: one conl-
parable sale n1ade to the conde1nnor itself:* and opinion 
testin1on~T offered b~~ only one "yitness of lin1ited ex-
perience and en1ployed b~~ the Yery contractor to \vhon1 
appellant furnished the 1naterial conde1nned. 
The testi1nony offered by respondents to support 
-x-In most jurisdictions, evidence of sales to the condemnor i~ 
not admissible. Anno. 118 A.L.R. 893; cf. Weber County ;. 
Ritchie, 98 Utah 272, 96 P. 2d 744. 
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thP da1uages resulting fron1 the taking ,,.a8, a8 indieated 
Parlier herein cou1petent and proper and the result of 
a lifeti1ne of experience in livestock operation, upon 
the vPr~· ground in question. l\[ oreover, this testi1nony 
\\·a8 eo1npletely uncontradicted! The valuation fixed and 
the da1nages a\varded -vvere \vithin the li1nits fixed hy 
all \\'itnesses called by respondents, \vith the exception 
of respondent Chournos himself whose testimony as to 
dan1age \vas $28,000.00, \vhereas l{:eller's \vas $35,000.00 
(Pages 19, 21 of this brief). 
In light of the evidence adduced belo\\·, \vhich \vould 
elParl~T support verdicts in excess of those returned 
by the jury, it is submitted that the follo\ving rule 
pronounced by this court in the early case of Brae g,r; e r 
v. O.S.L.R.R. Co., 2± Utah 391, 397, 68 J?ae. 140, is 
dispositive of appellant's contention: 
"The appellant co1nplains that the verdict 
appears to be excessive, and given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice and is not 
justified by the evidence. The ans\ver to this is 
that under our ·Constitution the a1nount of the 
verdict is a matter entirely \vithin the province 
of the trial court and jury, the san1e being a 
question of fact. If there is any evidence to sup-
port the verdict, this court has no po,ver to pass 
upon it, or to set the verdict aside as being 
excessive." (Emphasis supplied.) 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
PAYMENT OF THE JUDGl\IENT EN'TERED BELOW IN 
CASE NO. 8192 TO BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING 
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THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHALLENGE BY THE 
UNITED STA'TES TO THE VALIDITY OF RESPONDENTS' 
MINING CLAIMS. 
The Respondents, ~filton A. 01nan, \ ... irginia S. 
01nan, Sautuel X. Chournos, .] anice R. Chournos, Xick 
(;hournos, and Dorothy J(. Chournos, hereinafter re-
ferred to as respondents, have filed a cross appeal in 
this action, appealing fro1u the order 1nade and entered 
hy the eourt belo\Y on N ove1nber :2, 1959, in Case X o. 
819:2, "~hereunder appellant \Yas per1nitted to deposit 
''"·ith the clerk of the court belo\Y its payn1ent of the 
judg1nent entered in said case to be held pending an 
adntini~trative deter1nination of a challenge to the validi-
ty of respondents' sand and gravel placer mining claims 
1nade b~~ the l~nited States Govern1nent and presently 
pending before the lTnited States Depart1nent of the 
Interior. 
'l.,he gravel deposit extracted by appellant in Case 
X o. 81~):2 \Yas fron1 certain govern1nent lands upon \Yhieh 
~aid re~pondent~ had located certain sand and gravel 
placer 1nining clai1ns. The jury belo\Y found that the 
Yalne of the 1,:!:2:2,899 cubic yards of graYel and fill 
utaterial extraeted fro1n these clain1s "~as 3c per cubic 
yard, or a total of $36,686.97 ( Tr. 36:2). · 
It i~ the po~ition of respondents that regardless of 
L 
the u] tiu1ate deterutination 1nade by the lTnited State~ 
])eparhnent of Interior, or such Federal (,ourt as 1nay 
thPreafter a~su1ne jurisdietion of the contest filed by 
the GoYPrlnnent, that a~ bet\Yeen respondents and ap-
pellant in the instant ease, the forn1er are to he con-
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~iderPd the o\vner~ of the gravel deposits extracted and 
Pntitled to con1pensation therefor. 
It 1nay be conceded, for the sake of argu1uent only, 
that ulti1nately it 1nay be deter1nined at another tin1e 
and in other proceedings that as agaill.st the Lr nited 
Htatcs Gover1unent, respondents possessed no rights 
in the placer clai1ns fron1 which the gravel here involved 
\\'as extracted. Such a result, ho\vever, can in no "·ay 
affect the obligation of appellant in the instant ca~P . 
..Lc\ppellant, both in its co1nplaint and at the trial 
helo\\'", ackno\vledged respondents to be the locators of 
H~ placer 1nining claiu1s na1ned Sand X o. 2 and Sand 
Xo. 3" (Par. 3 Cou1plaint; Tr. 18) upon the area 1n 
(1uestion and fron1 \vhich the gravel \Yas extracted . 
.... c\ppellant \Yent upon the land and extracted the 
a1nount of gravel aforesaid under the order of innnediate 
occupaney granted by the trial court in accordance \\·ith 
I>aragraph 2 of the prayer of appellant's co1nplaint. 
It is significant that no order \Yas sought as again:--:t 
the l"'"nited States, if indeed such an order could be 
1nade; nor \Vas the party in \\·ho1n appellant no\v contends 
has better title than respondents, nan1ely, the · l..,.nited 
State~, ever 111ade a part~· to nor did the Govern1nent 
intervene in this action at any stage of the proceeding~. 
By I>aragraph -± of the prayer of its con1plaint, 
appellant agreed to pay the value assessed in these 
proceedings to Hthe person or persons \\,.ho n1ay he 
adjudged entitled thereto." Certainly, appellant cannot 
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no\v contend that the adjudication to "~hich it then had 
refernce \Va~ one that \Yas to be 1nade hy another tribunal 
in another proceeding. 
A~ stated above, appellant stipulated that respond-
ents \vere the 1nining clai1nan ts to the land in question 
and \Yere conceded to be the "locators" of said clain1s 
in plaintiff's con1plaint; and testi1nony \vas adduced by 
appellant itself sho,ving this to be the fact (Tr. 216). 
K o evidence \\~as offered by appellant to contest this 
fact nor to contest the validity of respondents~ clai1ns, 
for appellant clearly did not assert any interest in 
itself or any other person in such land by \vay of 
relocation or other\vise, nor did appellant offer any 
proof that respondents' rights had been ter1ninated by 
the Governn1ent at the ti1ne of appellanfs entry. for 
indeed that que~tion is still pending. 
1 ~ nder the posture of the evidence 1n the record, 
together ,,·ith the pleadings on file. it i~ sub1nitted that 
it 1nu~t be prestuned in the absence of a sho\ving to 
th(' contrar)~ that for the purposes of thi~ action, such 
elaiu1s \verP Yali<1 clai111~ and that re~pondents \Vere the 
O\Yners thereof. 
~Che la\\· is elear that a nnn1ng clai1n located upon 
puhli<' land~ belonging to the lT nited State~ i~ property 
to it~ fullP~t extent "Thieh 1nay be taxed, 1nortgaged, 
tran~·d'prrerl, ~old and inherited. r~. ""')· r.-.:. } .. ~tchererry. 
:!:·H) E.,. :!d 1 ~);-3 (lOth Ci r. 1D3(i) ; 30 l ~~('i~\_ :.!6. 30 l"'"~C~\_ :i;). 
~Phe general rule i~ stated at ;)() .. A 111. J nr.. :\[ines 
<tnrl l\Iinern1~. :~[):~. §103: 
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""B~? virtue of the Federal Statute (30 l?SC~-\ 
~()) a valid location, ,,·hether lode or placer, 
~egregates the land einbraced fron1 the public 
do1nain and operates as a grant by the United 
States of the right of present and exclusive pos-
session for such period as the locator rnay co1npl~· 
\\·ith the E-,ederal la\Y~ and the local regulations 
not inconsistent there,vith. 1 t is apparent that 
this right is as effective, for practical 1nining 
purposes, as the fee passed by the patent, for 
it inhibits an~,. further exploration of the pre1nises 
and authorizes the locator to 1naintain his pos-
session as against all other persons, including 
the government. It is clear that the locator's 
rights are not in any \ray dependent upon con-. 
tinuous occupation of his claim, for it is settled 
h:· an abundance of authority that actual pos-
session is no ruore necessary for the protection 
of the rights herein considered than for any 
other rights granted hy the 1Jnited Rtates." 
In the case ll. S. r. fl)thchererry, supra, \\?herein the 
rights of a n1ining clai1nant's lessee to graze the surface 
of the land as against the l ... nited States ,,,.ere discussed, 
the court, although holding that general grazing right~ 
are not included \Yithin the po~se~~ory rights of a Inin-
ing clairn, clearly indicated those rights that \Yere ~n 
included: 
""\\~e are ~ati~fied that under the .~·tatute the 
; n e r e location of a Jn in in rJ c l a ·in 1 fJ i r r s to t h r l o-
cator only the rirJllt to e.rplore for alld n1ine 
;n inerals, and to purcha~e the land if there has 
been a co1nplianee \vith the provisions of tl1P 
~tatute. As against third parties, the locator or 
hi~ a~~igns have exrlu~ive right to use the surface 
-of thi~ land, hut as against the l~nited Statrs, 
hi~ right i~ conditional and inchoatP. 
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The land is no !auger a JHtrt of the public 
donlain so far as the nti~nerals are concerned, and 
it is not oi)en to relocation until the rights of a 
forrner locator have tern1inated.'' (Ernphasis sup-
plied.) 
The only atternpt rnade by appellant that could be 
construed as an attack upon the validity of respondent~' 
clairn~ \Ya~ a certain atternpted cro~~-exarnination of 
respondent (;hournos during \Yhich the follo,ving collo-
quy took place ( Tr. 215-217) : 
"Q. X O"\Y these ruining elairns that-you and your 
"~ife, is it, ~Ir. Chournos J? And one of your 
farnily )? Three of you at least- I guess there 
are four of you 6? 
..._.\_. Three farnilies. ~Ie and rny "\Yife, rny son and 
his "\Yife, and l\Iilton Ornan and his \vife. 
Q. Yon \Yere parties in locating those rnining 
clairn~. "\Yere you not J? 
..._~. Yes. 
Q. That "\Ya~ about \Yhen J? July. 1955 J? Is that 
pretty close"? 
_L\. I think it "\Ya~ the spring of "53. or "'inter 
of \):). Sorne tirne in there. "~hen \Y'e filed thern. 
Q. _.A._nd after you located thern yon didn •t do 
any "\York on thern, did yon·? 
~rR. Ol\I.AK: I object to that as being totally 
iunna terinl. l{e allege~ in hi~ cornplaint "\Ye're 
the O"\YnPrs of the clain1~. "\Ye ans"\ver "\Ye are, 
and therP i~ no i~~ue as to that. 
~I B. ().CONN"OI~: It goe~ just to the Yalue. 
~11\. O:i\f.AX: It doe~n't go to the Yalue. It doesn·t 
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111ake anY differenee \\~hether anv \\~ork \vas 
. . 
done on then1 or not. 
'rHE l~O l ~l~T: I'n1 inclined to sustain that, as 
far as this particular phase of the proceed-
ings is concerned, Mr. O'Connor. I'll let you 
exa1nine hiin at length any time you \Yant to, 
before the Court only, on that subject. 
~lit O'CON~OR: All right. I'm not going to the 
title. I'n1 going to the question of his idea of 
the value. If he did an~~ \\Tork on theu1 or 
not for three or four year~. 
THJ-~~ COlTRT: What difference does it rnake 
\v·hether he \vorks on it or not~ He located 
the claim. 
:\Ilt O'·CONNOR: It goes to the value. 
THE COlTI~T: Well, as far as this lawsuit is 
concerned, the jury has got to consider that 
these people own the clai1ns. 
J~~ven a~~tuning, for the sake of argtunent only, 
that had appellant been allo\ved to pursue this exarnina-
tion and in so doing sought to qne~tion the O\\"nership 
of respondents, rather than the value fixed upon the 
1naterial, and asstuning further that, for the purpose of 
argtunent onJ~~, appellant n1ight lutYP sho\\·n failure to 
perforn1 the necessary as~c>s~·nnent \York prior to appell-
ant's entr~T' nevertheless, the la\v i~ \Yell settled that, 
in the ahsence of a valid rPloeation, failure to perforrn 
a.ssessrnent \York does not ipso facto terrninate the clairn-
ants· rights. Icke.s u. 1-.-irginirt-C'Tolorado DrcelO]Jntent 
Corp., :295 r~s 639, 35 S. Ct. 888, 79 L.Ed., 16:27. 
It is subrnitted, therefore, that for the purpose of 
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the instant action, under the la",.' the evidence and the 
pleadings, the o"\vnership of the right to extract 1ninerals 
front the area in question reposed in the respondents 
and none other, and that upon affir1nance of the judg-
utent belo,v, respondents are entitled to in1n1ediate pay-
Inent therefor. 
It is therefore subn1itted that the evidence presented 
belo\\" to the court and jury is sufficient and eon1petent 
to support the YPrdiets returned and that the verdicts 
of the jury and the judgn1ents entered thereon should be 
affir1ned. It is further subn1itted that the order of the 
court belo"\v of X ove1nber 2, 1959 in Case X o. 819:2. per-
Initting appellant to n1ake pa~~11ent of the judgn1ent 
entered therein to the clerk of the court to he held 
pending detern1ina tion of the challenge of the li nited 
States to the Yalidity of the respondents• placer 1nining 
elain1s should be vacated and set aside. 
R.espertfully subn1itted. 
0~1.._-\X l"- S..._~PER.8TJ~IX 
-~A t tor ne y :3 f o r De f e n da }d -~. 
Responde uts. and Cross A_p-
pellants. 
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